[VulnWatch] Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability (#NISR16022003d)

From: NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (nisrat_private)
Date: Mon Feb 17 2003 - 14:17:26 PST

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    NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
    
    Name:    Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability
    Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Application Server Release 9.0.2
    Severity:  Critical Risk
    Category:               Format String Vulnerability
    Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com
    Author:   David Litchfield (david@ngssoftware) and Mark Litchfield
    (markat_private)
    Date:   16th February 2003
    Advisory number: #NISR16022003d
    
    
    Description
    ***********
    Oracle's 9i Application Server offers a highly functional web server
    designed to seamlessly integrate with an Oracle backend database server.
    Based on Apache the server offers many environments for web based
    applications such as Java/JSP, PL/SQL, Perl and FastCGI. With their latest
    release of the Application Server, 9.0.2, Oracle has added support for
    WebDAV, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, that turns the Web into a
    file sharing system.
    
    
    Details
    *******
    DAV is turned on by default. Whilst this is bad in and of itself, as
    attackers can anonymously upload files to the server, an attacker can
    exploit a format string bug in the one of the logging functions. If an
    attacker uses the COPY method and supplies a destination URI that uses a
    different scheme or port then a 502 Bad Gateway response is returned. This
    is logged and in doing so the format string can be exploited. Although the
    Apache mod dav module is not vulnerable itself the vulnerable code is
    there - it is just not ever executed. Oracle has modified the moddav module
    and changed it so bad gateway responses are logged - and thus they are
    vulnerable. Looking at the moddav source
    
    From mod_dav.c revision 1.157
    
    ..
    ..
    lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
    if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
    {
          if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
          {
                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
    r,lookup.err.desc);
                return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
          }
          return dav_error_response(r, lookup.err.status, lookup.err.desc);
    }
    ..
    ..
    
    This code calls the dav_lookup_uri() function in dav_util.c. From dav_util.c
    revision 1.84
    
    ..
    dav_lookup_result dav_lookup_uri(const char *uri, request_rec * r)
    {
    ..
    ..
    if (strcasecmp(comp.scheme, scheme) != 0 || comp.port != port)
    {
          result.err.status = HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
          result.err.desc = ap_psprintf(r->pool,
          "Destination URI refers to different "
          "scheme or port (%s://hostname:%d)\n"
          "(want: %s://hostname:%d)",
          comp.scheme ? comp.scheme : scheme,
          comp.port ? comp.port : port,
          scheme, port);
    
          return result;
    
    ..
    ..
    }
    
    When dav_lookup_uri() returns to mod_dav.c the format strings occurs
    
    ..
    lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
    if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
    {
          if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
          {
          // THIS IS THE FIRST FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITY
          ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
    r,lookup.err.desc);
    ..
    ..
    }
    
    
    Of course the code should have read
    
    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
    r,"%s",lookup.err.desc);
    
    to not be vulnerable.
    
    By crafting a specially formed format string and sending to the server an
    attacker can overwrite arbitrary address with arbitrary values which can
    allow an attacker to gain control of the web server. To do this they could
    overwrite a saved return address on the stack, an exception handler or
    pointer to a function with an address that points to a buffer that contains
    the arbitrary code to execute.
    
    Fix Information
    ***************
    NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 24th September 2002.
    Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
    
    http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert52.pdf
    
    A check for these issues has been added to OraScan, a comprehensive
    automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Application Servers of
    which more information is available from the NGSSite
    
    http://www.nextgenss.com/software/orascan.html
    
    About NGSSoftware
    *****************
    NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
    security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have
    offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's
    sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
    services, specialising in application, host and network security
    assessments.
    
    http://www.ngssoftware.com/
    http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
    
    Telephone +44 208 401 0070
    Fax +44 208 401 0076
    
    enquiriesat_private
    



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