-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-securityat_private openpkgat_private OpenPKG-SA-2003.010 18-Feb-2003 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: php, apache Vulnerability: arbitrary file access and code execution OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT == php-4.3.0-20030115 >= php-4.3.1-20030218 <= apache-1.3.27-20030212 >= apache-1.3.27-20030218 >= apache-1.3.27-20021228 >= apache-1.3.27-20030218 OpenPKG 1.2 == php-4.3.0-1.2.0 >= php-4.3.0-1.2.1 == apache-1.3.27-1.2.0 >= apache-1.3.27-1.2.1 OpenPKG 1.1 none N.A. Dependent Packages: none Description: Kosmas Skiadopoulos discovered a serious security vulnerability [0] in the CGI SAPI of PHP version 4.3.0. PHP [1] contains code for preventing direct access to the CGI binary with configure option "--enable-force-cgi-redirect" and php.ini option "cgi.force_redirect". In PHP 4.3.0 there is a bug which renders these options useless. Please note that this bug does NOT affect any of the other SAPI modules such as the Apache or ISAPI modules. Anyone with access to websites hosted on a web server which employs the CGI module may exploit this vulnerability to gain access to any file readable by the user under which the webserver runs. A remote attacker could also trick PHP into executing arbitrary PHP code if attacker is able to inject the code into files accessible by the CGI. This could be for example the web server access-logs. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q php apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_php". If you have either the "php" or "apache" with option "with_mod_php" packages installed and their version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade (see Solution) [2][3]. Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [7], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [3]. For the release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem for apache with mod_php. For other releases adjust this recipe accordingly. $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD ftp> get apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild --define 'with_mod_php yes' \ apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.*.rpm ________________________________________________________________________ References: [0] http://www.php.net/release_4_3_1.php [1] http://www.php.net/ [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/php-4.3.0-1.2.1.src.rpm [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/ [7] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkgat_private>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com". ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkgat_private> iD8DBQE+Ul0CgHWT4GPEy58RAiylAJ0UMcYLUNYbOOl1oFIuqfAxWALcagCgxUsx I0CUzWnNLnX57B9wHXCwWWQ= =dpIT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Feb 18 2003 - 08:43:42 PST