> -----Original Message----- > From: Oliver Lavery [mailto:oliver.laveryat_private] > Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 3:23 PM > To: 'Drew Copley'; bugtraqat_private > Subject: RE: Bypassing Personal Firewalls > > > >(Sidenote: a number of previous apps used to test PFWs or Application > Firewalls -- > >http://www.pcflank.com/art21.htm ) > > Yes, these are great tests. Most PFWs block them all now. I believe TooLeaky and Firehole remain unfixed on some firewalls. Too leaky apparently just runs IE with a url cmd argument. Firewall uses the messy way of hooking: SetWindowsHookEx > > >There are a number of ways to do this, you use the more > popular method > >of > openprocess and > >writeprocess memory. However, there is a limit to the number of api > >calls > which implement this. > >Ultimately, this kind of code needs to be blocked, first, at > the NT API > level... Such blocking > >should use the same method as blocking the network calls, > ie, "Do you > >want > to allow this > >application to ..." > > Yes. Before we go prompting users ever time someone > calls CreateFile, though, there are much simpler measures. > One of them would make OpenProcess require a priviledge of > some sort (see below). > > >Most commonly, this would be used with writeprocess memory. > >Createremotethread would need to be blocked in this manner. > Postremotethreadmessage. > >PostThreadMessage. Are some of the more dangerous calls, in this > >context. > > You'll notice that all of these calls require a handle > returned by OpenProcess (hProcess in my code). > > >After that, you are probably talking about having to do somesort of > signature analysis at the > >binary level. > > MD5 of the binary memory image! This is probably > feasible, but good god it would resource intensive. Any such method remains limited. You are in the openrange here. Here is a relevant and interesting paper: http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/saurabh/papers/oh.pdf "Abstract. We describe a novel software verification primitive called Oblivious Hashing. Unlike previous techniques that mainly verify the static shape of code, this primitive allows implicit computation of a hash value based on the actual execution (i.e., space-time history of computation) of the code. We also describe its applications in local software tamper resistance and remote code authentication." > > >OpenProcess does require seDebugPrivileges, I believe. > > No, and this is very much the point. According to MS docs: > SeDebugPrivilege: > Determines which users can attach a debugger to any process. > This privilege provides powerful access to sensitive and > critical operating system components. > > This only prevents users from using OpenProcess on > system processes (winlogon.exe etc.). There need to be > tighter restrictions on the use of OpenProcess. Ah, that's right, remember now. > > Cheers, > ~ol > > >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Feb 21 2003 - 16:09:49 PST