Sendmail buffer overflow vulnerability in AIX.

From: Shiva Persaud (shivapdat_private)
Date: Mon Mar 03 2003 - 09:35:01 PST

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    IBM SECURITY ADVISORY
    
    First Issued: Fri Feb 21 11:00:00 CST 2003
    
    ===========================================================================
                               VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
    
    VULNERABILITY:      sendmail buffer overflow vulnerability.
    
    PLATFORMS:          AIX 4.3, 5.1 and 5.2
    
    SOLUTION:           Apply the workaround, efix or APARs as described below.
    
    THREAT:             A remote attacker can exploit a buffer overflow to
                        gain root privileges.
    
    CERT VU Number:     398025
    CVE Number:         n/a
    ===========================================================================
                               DETAILED INFORMATION
    
    
    I.  Description
    ===============
    
    Sendmail is a MTA (mail transfer agent) that routes mail for local or
    network delivery. When sendmail receives a message it translates the
    format of message headers to match the requirements of the destination
    system. The program determines the destination via the syntax and content
    of the address field in a message header. A vulnerability that exploits
    how message headers are parsed has been found. This vulnerability allows
    a remote attacker to gain root privileges. At this time, there is no known
    exploit in the wild for this vulnerability.
    
    The sendmail daemon runs on all versions of AIX by default. To determine
    if sendmail is running on your system execute the following:
    
    #lssrc -s sendmail
    
    If sendmail is running, the following will be displayed:
    
    Subsystem         Group            PID     Status
     sendmail         mail             xxxx    active
    
    Where xxxx is the pid of the sendmail process on your system.
    
    If sendmail is not installed, the system is not vulnerable.
    
    
    II. Impact
    ==========
    
    A remote attacker can gain root privileges.
    
    
    III.  Solutions
    ===============
    
    A. Official Fix
    IBM provides the following fixes:
    
          APAR number for AIX 4.3.3: IY40500 (available approx. 03/12/2003)
          APAR number for AIX 5.1.0: IY40501 (available approx. 04/28/2003)
          APAR number for AIX 5.2.0: IY40502 (available approx. 04/28/2003)
    
    NOTE: Fixes will not be provided for versions prior to 4.3 as
    these are no longer supported by IBM. Affected customers are
    urged to upgrade to 4.3.3 or 5.1.0 at the latest maintenance level.
    
    B. E-fix
    Temporary fixes for AIX 4.3.3, 5.1.0, and 5.2.0 systems are available.
    
    The temporary fixes can be downloaded via ftp from:
    
         ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/sendmail_efix.tar.Z
    
    The efix compressed tarball contains three fixes: one each for
    AIX 4.3.3, AIX 5.1.0 and AIX 5.2.0. It also includes this Advisory
    and a README file with installation instructions.
    
    Verify you have retrieved this efix intact:
    - - ---------------------------------------------
    There are 3 fix-files in this package for the 4.3.3, 5.1.0, 5.2.0
    releases. The checksums below were generated using the "sum" and
    "md5" commands and are as follows:
    
    Filename       sum            md5
    =================================================================
    sendmail.433   61331   428    013f747e5a447e2dec777e2e840914a9
    sendmail.510   34257  1059    5f282fd2a472c2d75c88c3c652312842
    sendmail.520   45494  1007    88bcb028aab4625abe0257d3537a0813
    
    These sums should match exactly; if they do not, double check the
    command results and the download site address. If those are OK,
    contact IBM AIX Security at security-alertat_private and describe
    the discrepancy.
    
    IMPORTANT: Create a mksysb backup of the system and verify it is
    both bootable, and readable before proceeding.
    
    These temporary fixes have not been fully regression tested; thus,
    IBM does not warrant the fully correct functioning of the efix.
    Customers install the efix and operate the modified version of AIX
    at their own risk.
    
    Efix Installation Instructions:
    - - ---------------------------------
    Detailed installation instructions can be found in the README file
    supplied in the efix package. These instructions are summarized below.
    
    You need to have the following filesets installed. This ensures that
    the proper versions of co-requisite system files, such as libc.a, are
    installed:
    
    For AIX 4.3.3:
    bos.net.tcp.client.4.3.3.87
    
    For AIX 5.1.0:
    bos.net.tcp.client.5.1.0.38
    
    For AIX 5.2.0:
    bos.net.tcp.client.5.2.0.1
    
    You can determine which fileset is installed by executing
    the following:
    
       # lslpp -L bos.net.tcp.client
    
    
    1. Create a temporary efix directory and move to that directory.
       # mkdir /tmp/efix
       # cd /tmp/efix
    
    2. Move the efix to /tmp/efix, uncompress it and un-tar the resulting
       tarfile. Move to the fix directory.
       # cp PATH_TO_ADVISORY /tmp/efix # where PATH_TO_ADVISORY is the fully
                                       # qualified path to the efix package.
       # uncompress sendmail_efix.tar.Z
       # tar xvf sendmail_efix.tar
       # cd sendmail_efix
    
    3. Rename the patched binary files appropriate for your system and set
       ownership and permissions.
       # mv sendmail.xxx sendmail      # where xxx is 433, 510 or 520
       # chown root.system sendmail
       # chmod 6551 sendmail
    
    4. Create a backup copy of original binary. Remove all
       permissions from the backup copy.
       # cd /usr/sbin
       # cp sendmail sendmail.orig
       # chmod 0 sendmail.orig
    
    5. Stop sendmail.
       # stopsrc -s sendmail
    
    6. Replace the current system binary with the patched
       binary. Use the -p option to preserve the file
       permissions set in step 3.
       # cp -p /tmp/efix/sendmail_efix/sendmail /usr/sbin/sendmail
    
    7. Restart sendmail.
       # startsrc -s sendmail -a "-bd -q15"
    
       The -bd flag starts sendmail as a daemon running in the
       background as a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) mail router.
    
       The -q15 flag tells the sendmail daemon to process the queue every
       15 minutes.
    
       It may be desirable to initialize sendmail differently on the
       system being patched. Modify the flags accordingly.
    
    C. Workaround
    Turn sendmail off. You can do this by executing the following:
       # stopsrc -s sendmail
    
    Note that legitimate requests to sendmail will fail. If this is not feasible
    in your environment, please apply the efix as described in Section III B.
    
    
    IV. Obtaining Fixes
    ===================
    
    IBM AIX APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via the
    FixDist program), or from the IBM Support Center.  For more information
    on FixDist, and to obtain fixes via the Internet, please reference
    
            http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6k/fixes.html
    
    or send email to "aixservat_private" with the word "FixDist" in the
    "Subject:" line.
    
    AIX APARs may also be downloaded from the web from the following URLs.
    
    For 4.3.3 APARs:
              http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6k/fixdb.html
    
    For 5.1.0 APARs:
              http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/aix.fdc
    
    For 5.2.0 APARs:
              http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/aix.fdc
    
    To facilitate ease of ordering all security related APARs for each AIX
    release, security fixes are periodically bundled into a cumulative APAR.
    For more information on these cumulative APARs including last update and
    list of individual fixes, send email to "aixservat_private" with
    the word "subscribe Security_APARs" in the "Subject:" line.
    
    
    V. Acknowledgments
    ==================
    
    The AIX Security Team would like to thank Sendmail, Inc. for bringing this
    issue to our attention.
    
    This document was written by Shiva Persaud.
    
    
    VI.  Contact Information
    ========================
    
    Comments regarding the content of this announcement can be directed to:
    
       security-alertat_private
    
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    Please contact your local IBM AIX support center for any assistance.
    
    IBM and AIX are a registered trademark of International Business
    Machines Corporation.  All other trademarks are property of their
    respective holders.
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