Re: Ecardis Password Reseting Vulnerability

From: Trish Lynch (trishat_private)
Date: Mon Mar 03 2003 - 09:37:05 PST

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    >From: Haluk AYDIN <haydinat_private>
    >To: bugtraqat_private
    >Subject: Ecardis Password Reseting Vulnerability
    >
    >
    >
    >Hi,
    >
    >I don't know if someone has discovered this before but
    Ecartis 1.0.0 
    >(former listar) contains a vulnerability that enables
    an attacker to reset 
    >passwords of any user defined on the list server,
    including the list 
    >admins. 
    >
    >After logging on as a non-priviledged user, Ecartis
    enables the user to 
    >change his/her password, but does not ask for the old
    one. The first time 
    >I have seen this, I thought that the software relies
    on the session 
    >cookie, but it seems this is not the case. 
    >
    >The html page contains the username in the "hidden"
    fields. After saving 
    >the page on disk, then replacing all "hidden" fields
    with another username 
    >which is defined in the server, and reloading the page
    again we can try 
    >our chance to change the password. Just fill in the
    empty password fields 
    >with a password of your choice, and click "Change
    Password": there you 
    >are... You have just reset the victim's password.
    >
    >I have not tested this on different versions, but I
    guess it will work for 
    >all of them. I would appreciate any comments on the issue.
    >
    >Regards,
    >
    
    
    Thank you for bringing this to our attention, it was
    fixed only a few hours after recieving this.
    
    The FreeBSD port (which I maintain) has also been updated
    
    Please use snapshot versions after 20030227, and make
    sure the FreeBSD port is update as well.
    
    -Trish Lynch - ecartis core team. 
    



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