R7-0010: Buffer Overflow in Lotus Notes Protocol Authentication

From: Rapid 7 Security Advisories (advisoryat_private)
Date: Thu Mar 13 2003 - 00:14:59 PST

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    Rapid7 Advisory R7-0010
    Buffer Overflow in Lotus Notes Protocol Authentication
    
       Published:  March 12, 2003
       Revision:   1.0
       http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0010.html
    
       CVE:           CAN-2003-0122
       Lotus SPR:     DBAR5CJJJS
       IBM Technote:  1105101
       Bugtraq ID:    7037
    
    1. Affected system(s):
    
       KNOWN VULNERABLE:
        o Lotus Notes R4
        o Lotus Notes R5 up to and including R5.0.11
        o Lotus Notes R6 betas and pre-releases
    
       NOT VULNERABLE:
        o Lotus Notes R5.0.12
        o Lotus Notes R6.0 Gold
        o Lotus Notes R6.0.1
    
       UNKNOWN / NOT TESTED:
        o Lotus Notes R3 and earlier
    
    2. Summary
    
       Lotus Notes and Domino servers support a proprietary protocol called
       NotesRPC, commonly known as the Notes protocol.  This protocol is
       usually bound to TCP port 1352, but can also use NetBIOS, Netware
       SPX, Banyan Vines, and modem dialup for transport.
    
       When a Notes client connects to a Notes server, it authenticates with
       the server to establish a session.  This authentication consists of a
       series of exchanges in which the client and server present each other
       with challenges to verify each other's identity.
    
       It is possible for an unauthenticated client to manipulate the data
       during this exchange to trigger a buffer overflow on the Notes
       server.  This allows an attacker to overwrite large sections of the
       heap with arbitrary data.  While our testing only covered TCP/IP, we
       believe it is possible for this overflow to be triggered via other
       protocols, including dialup.  It is theoretically possible for an
       attacker to supply the data in such a way as to compromise the
       Notes server's security.
    
    3. Vendor status and information
    
       Lotus
       http://www.lotus.com/
       http://www.ibm.com/
    
       Lotus was notified and they have fixed this vulnerability.  Lotus is
       tracking this issue with SPR #DBAR5CJJJS.  [1] IBM has also prepared
       Technote #1105101, which discusses this vulnerability.  [2]
    
       See the References section for more information.
    
    4. Solution
    
       This vulnerability is fixed in R5.0.12 and R6.0 Gold.  Customers
       running R5.0.11 or earlier (or Notes R6 beta) are advised to upgrade.
       R6.0 Gold is not affected, but due to other vulnerabilities
       discovered in R6.0 Gold, you should consider upgrading to R6.0.1,
       which was released in February 2003.
    
       Domino incremental installers may be downloaded from the following
       URL (which has been wrapped):
    
       http://www14.software.ibm.com
          /webapp/download/search.jsp?go=y&rs=ESD-DMNTSRVRi&sb=r
    
       For more information on partial mitigation strategies for this
       and other Notes vulnerabilities (including best practices for
       Internet-facing Domino servers), please see Rapid7's FAQ for
       these vulnerabilities at:
    
          http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0010-info.html
    
    5. Detailed analysis
    
       During NotesRPC authentication, the client sends the server its
       distinguished name (DN).  The distinguished name is a string that
       looks like "CN=John Smith/O=Acme/C=US".  The DN string is prefixed
       by a 16-bit word that specifies its length.  The outer packet
       structure contains a header field that refers to the DN field's
       length (which is the length of the prefix plus the length of the
       DN itself).
    
       If the length specified in the outer header field is less than or
       equal to the length specified in the DN field, an error occurs in
       the data offset arithmetic such that a total of 65534 bytes are
       copied onto the Notes heap (a proprietary structure managed by
       Notes API calls such as OSMemoryAllocate).  An attacker can supply
       all of the bytes to be copied by specifying additional data in the
       packet after the DN.
    
    6. References
    
       [1] Lotus SPR #DBAR5CJJJS (URL wrapped)
       http://www-10.lotus.com
          /ldd/r5fixlist.nsf/Search?SearchView&Query=DBAR5CJJJS
    
       [2] IBM Technote #1105101 (URL wrapped)
       http://www-1.ibm.com
          /support/docview.wss?rs=482&q=Domino&uid=swg21105101
    
    7. Contact Information
    
       Rapid7 Security Advisories
       Email:   advisoryat_private
       Web:     http://www.rapid7.com/
       Phone:   +1 (212) 558-8700
    
    8. Disclaimer and Copyright
    
       Rapid7, Inc. is not responsible for the misuse of the information
       provided in our security advisories.  These advisories are a service
       to the professional security community.  There are NO WARRANTIES
       with regard to this information.  Any application or distribution of
       this information constitutes acceptance AS IS, at the user's own
       risk.  This information is subject to change without notice.
    
       This advisory Copyright (C) 2003 Rapid7, Inc.  Permission is
       hereby granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no
       changes are made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers
       remain intact.
    
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