On Wed, 26 Mar 2003 11:14:43 -0500, you wrote: >Unfortunately, on my US Windows 2K SP3 build (and I assume all others), >those %u directives get translated into question marks. (0x003F in hex) >:< >> "%u32ac%u77e2", I tried the "%u trick" while coding rs_iis.c exploit and it happened as Dave stated so I forgot the idea. I was using Spanish W2k Server + SP2. Another problem with Mat's exploit is that it seems not to check well when the exploit is successful or not. When the exploit has success (which is impossible at least in Spanish/US Windows versions due to the %u problem), IIS will not respond neither close the connection so the exploit keeps waiting until the 15 secs timer expires. Then $flagexit=1 and sendraw2 function returns "Timeout", so main program will print "Failed to exploit: Server not crashed\n". This is wrong. It should have printed something like "Success". It looks like a silly issue but perhaps the people (with Japanese Windows version?) trying the exploit never notices it was successful. Related to my exploit and after receiving some feedback (thanks ppl!), I'd like to clarify: 1) The offset between the start of the string and the address where RET is placed could change. What I did was to put many instances of the RET value so chances of a right guess were higher. This cover the cases where offset is incremented or decremented by a 2*x value. Nevertheless, there will be one align problem if the offset changes by (2*x+1). In that case, the least significant byte of RET becomes the more significant one. Fermín J. Serna <fjsernaat_private> pointed the easy solution: use a RET value with the two bytes being identical. So the recommended way to perform a brute force attack with rs_iis.c is to try: 0x0101, 0x0202, 0x0303, ..., 0xffff (255 possible RET values). 2) I've attached a bash script which demonstrates this and makes easier the testing of a vulnerable machine. You should adjust the TIMEOUT variable (in seconds), so IIS is alive when the script tries a new RET value. Regards, --Roman -- PGP Fingerprint: 09BB EFCD 21ED 4E79 25FB 29E1 E47F 8A7D EAD5 6742 [Key ID: 0xEAD56742. Available at KeyServ]
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