Versions older than 1.1.4-b3 and 1.1.3-20030409 affected. This seems to be
exploitable only with Linux.
PPTP?
-----
PPTP-over-IPSEC is commonly used to create VPNs. Windows plays quite nicely
with it.
problem
-------
PPTP packet header contain 16bit length which specifies the full size of
the packet:
bytes_this = read(clientFd, packet + bytes_ttl, 2 - bytes_ttl);
// ...
bytes_ttl += bytes_this;
// ...
length = htons(*(u_int16_t *) packet);
if (length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
// abort
}
Looks good so far, except:
bytes_this = read(clientFd, packet + bytes_ttl, length - bytes_ttl);
If given length was 0 or 1, the "length - bytes_ttl" result is -1 or -2,
which means that it reads unlimited amount of data from client into
"packet", which is a buffer located in stack.
The exploitability only depends on if libc allows the size parameter to be
larger than SSIZE_MAX bytes. GLIBC does, Solaris and *BSD don't.
tips of the day
---------------
Don't do arithmetic in parameters specifying buffer size.
Block PPTP port for non-IPSEC connections, if you don't already.
patch
-----
This is the same as in latest versions:
--- ctrlpacket.c.old 1999-12-23 23:43:33.000000000 +0200
+++ ctrlpacket.c 2003-04-09 18:58:21.000000000 +0300
@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@
}
/* OK, we have (at least) the first 2 bytes, and there is data waiting */
length = htons(*(u_int16_t *) packet);
- if (length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "CTRL: Control packet > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE (length = %d)", length);
+ if (length <= 10 || length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "CTRL: 11 < Control packet (length=%d) < ", length);
/* we loose sync (unless we malloc something big, which isn't a good
* idea - potential DoS) so we must close connection (draft states that
* if you loose sync you must close the control connection immediately)
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Apr 09 2003 - 22:05:22 PDT