Re: Cracking preshared keys

From: Michael Thumann (mlthumann@ids-guide.de)
Date: Thu Apr 24 2003 - 12:31:48 PDT

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    Noone was talkig about that IPSec isn't secure because of this attack 
    scenario. We gave recommendations how to configure IPSec in a secure way 
    with a proof of concept what might happen, if you don't. The described 
    attack won't work too, if aggressive mode can be disabled as for example in 
    Checkpoint FW-1, so it doens't depend only on a crackable PSK.
    
    Using this attack every PSK is crackable, but good ones aren't crackable in 
    an acceptable amount of time. I don't want to start another discussion 
    about how to choose good password or preshared keys, I totally agree that 
    you get a lot of security when you choose strong ones, but if you take a 
    look at SANS TOP 20 ( http://www.sans.org/top20/ ) you can see that's still 
    one of the most common problems in praxis.
    
    So I think, that you can see that we don't have different point of views 
    how to configure secure VPNs ;-)
    
    At 00:08 24.04.03 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
    >Michael Thumann  wrote:
    > >we would like to announce the publication of a proof of concept paper 'PSK
    > >cracking using IKE Aggressive Mode'. Paper can be downloaded from
    > >www.ernw.de/download/pskattack.pdf .
    >[...]
    > >4. Of course the psk must be weak to crack it in an acceptable amount of 
    > time
    >
    >Well, what did you expect?  In your example, the pre-shared key was
    >derived from the ``secret'' string "cisco".  Of course, if you choose
    >a key that the attacker can guess, the system won't be secure.  Surprise!
    >
    >What do you expect IPSec to do if you give it an insecure, guessable key?
    >Noone claimed it would be secure in such a situation.
    >
    >I find your recommendations hard to take seriously.  This is not a
    >vulnerability in IPSec, a good reason to disable vpn access, or anything
    >like that.  Just use some common sense in how you use the crypto.  If you
    >must use pre-shared keys, choose strong keys; or, use public keys instead
    >of pre-shared keying.  Surely you agree?
    >
    >User: "Doctor, doctor, it hurts when I use insecure crypto keys."
    >Doctor: "Don't do that, then."
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Michael Thumann        mlthumann@ids-guide       www.ids-guide.de
    Public Key available at http://www.ids-guide.de/MichaelThumann.asc
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The only secure computer is one that's unplugged, locked in a safe,
    and buried 20 feet under the ground in a secret location...and i'm not
    even too sure about that one
                                                                        --Dennis 
    Huges, FBI. 
    



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