[Full-Disclosure] CORE-2003-0403: Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass

From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories (advisoriesat_private)
Date: Tue May 27 2003 - 11:19:04 PDT

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                             Core Security Technologies Advisory
                                 http://www.coresecurity.com
    
                        Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass
    
    
    
    Date Published: 2003-05-27
    
    Last Update: 2003-05-23
    
    Advisory ID: CORE-2003-0403
    
    Bugtraq ID: 7652
    
    CVE Name: CAN-2003-0240
    
    Title: Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass
    
    Class: Access Validation Error
    
    Remotely Exploitable: Yes
    
    Locally Exploitable: No
    
    Advisory URL:
      http://www.coresecurity.com/common/showdoc.php?idx=329&idxseccion=10
    
    Vendors contacted:
      - Axis Communications
        . Core Notification: 2003-04-10
        . Notification acknowledged by Axis: 2003-04-17
        . 2.34 Release candidate for the Axis 2400/2401 Video Servers
          available: 2003-04-17
        . Fixed versions available for all affected products: 2003-05-27
    
    Release Mode: COORDINATED RELEASE
    
    
    *Vulnerability Description:*
    
      An Axis Network Camera captures and transmits live images directly
      over an IP network (e.g. LAN/intranet/Internet), enabling users to
      remotely view and/or manage the camera from a Web browser on any
      computer. For more information see http://www.axis.com
    
      After setting up the Axis Camera, the user is provided with
      Web-based Administration Tools for configuring and managing the
      camera by accessing http://camera-ip/admin/admin.shtml, which
      requires a username and password.
    
      We have discovered the following security vulnerability: by accessing
         http://camera-ip//admin/admin.shtml
      (notice the double slash) the authentication for "admin" is bypassed
      and an attacker gains direct access to the configuration.
    
      Using this vulnerability, an attacker can reset the root password,
      then enable the telnet server by modifying configuration files,
      giving the attacker interactive access to a Unix like command line,
      allowing her to execute arbitrary commands as root.
    
    
    *Vulnerable Packages:*
    
      . AXIS 2100 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2110 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2120 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2130 PTZ Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2400 Video Server versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2401 Video Server versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2420 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
      . AXIS 2460 Network DVR versions 3.00 and previous
      . AXIS 250S Video Server versions 3.02 and previous
    
    
    *Solution/Vendor Information/Workaround:*
    
      Axis Communications has released new firmwares closing this
      vulnerability in its Network Camera and Video Server products.
    
      New releases are available at:
    
      AXIS 2100 Network Camera: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2100/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2110 Network Camera: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2110/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2120 Network Camera: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2120/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2130 Network Camera: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2130/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2400 Video Server: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2400/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2401 Video Server: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2401/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2420 Network Camera: 2.34
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2420/2_34/
    
      AXIS 2460 Network DVR: 3.10
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2460/3_10/
    
      AXIS 250S Video Server: 3.03
       ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_250s/3_03/
    
      Recommended Actions:
      We strongly recommend that all devices are updated to these
      firmware versions.
    
    
    *Credits:*
    
      This vulnerability was found by Juliano Rizzo from Core Security
      Technologies.
    
      We wish to thank Joacim Tullberg from Axis for his quick response to
      this issue.
    
    
    *Technical Description - Exploit/Concept Code:*
    
      We have discovered the following security vulnerability: by accessing
       http://camera-ip//admin/admin.shtml
      (notice the double slash) the authentication for "admin" is bypassed
      and an attacker gains direct access to the configuration.
    
      In the same way, an attacker can access the other administration
      tools for the camera, for example:
       http://camera-ip//admin/img_general.shtml
       http://camera-ip//admin/netw_tcp.shtml
       http://camera-ip//admin/sys_date.shtml
       http://camera-ip//admin/com_port.shtml
       http://camera-ip//admin/op_general.shtml
       http://camera-ip//admin/sys_motiond.shtml
    
      Note that the workaround for a recently published Axis HTTP Server
      vulnerability (see reference [1]) was to add authentication to
      some particular paths. With this vulnerability the authentication
      can be bypassed, so the mentioned Information Disclosure
      vulnerability can still be exploited.
    
      The affected Axis devices run a Linux like operating system. With
      this vulnerability an attacker can reset the root password. Then
      using the default open ftp server, the attacker can download
      configuration files, modify these files and upload them again.
      Modifying /etc/inittab it is possible to enable the Telnet server
      (see [2] a technical note explaining how to enable Telnet support),
      giving the attacker interactive access to a Unix like command line.
      Axis provides free developer tools (see [3]), so it is feasible
      for an attacker to build tools like port scanners or proxies to
      start attacks from the compromised camera (which are usually
      installed inside internal networks) which could lead to the
      compromise of the internal network.
    
    
    *References:*
    
      [1] Axis Communications HTTP Server Messages Information Disclosure
      Vulnerability (published 2003-02-28):
      http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6980/
    
      [2] Technical Note: Enable Telnet Support in the Axis Camera Servers
      http://www.axis.com/techsup/cam_servers/tech_notes/telnet_support.htm
      As stated in this page: "You should enable this option for experimental
      use only. Never leave the Telnet access enabled when having the
      Network Camera installed on a public site."
    
      [3] Axis' developer site (where a compiler and other development
      tools can be downloaded):
      http://developer.axis.com/
    
    
    *About Core Security Technologies*
    
      Core Security Technologies develops strategic security solutions for
      Fortune 1000 corporations, government agencies and military
      organizations. The company offers information security software and
      services designed to assess risk and protect and manage information
      assets.
      Headquartered in Boston, MA, Core Security Technologies can be
      reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com.
    
      To learn more about CORE IMPACT, the first comprehensive penetration
      testing framework, visit:
      http://www.coresecurity.com/products/coreimpact
    
    
    *DISCLAIMER:*
    
      The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2003 CORE Security
      Technologies and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is
      charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.
    
    $Id: Axis-advisory.txt,v 1.7 2003/05/23 20:17:29 carlos Exp $
    
    
    
    
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