Etherleak information leak in Windows Server 2003 drivers

From: NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (nisrat_private)
Date: Mon Jun 09 2003 - 05:40:50 PDT

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    NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
    
    Name: Etherleak information leak in Windows Server 2003 drivers
    Systems Affected: Windows Server 2003 (all versions)
    Severity: Low/Medium Risk
    Vendor URL: http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/
    Author: Chris Paget (chrispat_private)
    Date: 9th June 2003
    Advisory URL: http://www.nextgenss.com/advisories/etherleak-2003.txt
    Advisory number: #NISR09062003
    
    
    Description
    ***********
    Several NIC device drivers that ship with Windows Server 2003 have
    been found to disclose information in a similar way to the 'Etherleak'
    frame padding issue announced by @Stake in January 2003.  The original
    Etherleak paper and subsequent discussion was concerned with ICMP
    message padding; NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (NISR) have
    observed a similar issue within a TCP stream.
    
    
    Details
    *******
    The original Etherleak paper from Ofir Arkin and Josh Anderson of
    @Stake (available at
    http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/atstake_etherleak_report.pdf)
    concerns itself primarily with frame padding of ICMP messages with
    non-zero bytes; the padding bytes could potentially come from any area
    of physical memory.  NISR have observed the issue within a TCP stream,
    particularly during the FIN-ACK exchange when a connection is
    gracefully closed.  To date, NISR have not seen any discussion of
    Etherleak-style vulnerabilities within a TCP stream, only ICMP.  It is
    possible that vendors are only testing for ethernet frame padding
    issues within ICMP and are neglecting TCP.
    
    When the @Stake paper was released, Microsoft stated that tests would
    be added to the Microsoft driver certification program which
    specifically checked for this issue; NISR are releasing this advisory
    since there are multiple drivers shipped with Windows Server 2003
    which are vulnerable and yet certified by Microsoft and included on
    the CD.  
    
    Vulnerable drivers include:
    VIA Rhine II Compatible network card (integrated into some
    motherboards).
    AMD PCNet family network cards (Used by several versions of VMWare)
    
    Both drivers are digitally signed by the Microsoft Windows Publisher,
    and are included on the Windows Server 2003 CD.  Both drivers exhibit
    the same behaviour, that of padding frames with arbitrary data.  The
    FIN-ACK packets exchanged during the graceful close of a TCP
    connection are a particularly good source of information; several
    bytes of potentially sensitive data (including POP3 passwords) has
    been observed appended to the data portion of Ethernet frames sent by
    these cards.
    
    
    Fix Information
    ***************
    Microsoft's statement regarding this issue on the CERT website
    (available at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/JPLA-5BGP7V) states: 
    "Microsoft does not ship any Microsoft written drivers that contain
    the vulnerability. However, we have found some 3rd party drivers and
    samples in our documentation that, when compiled without alteration,
    could yield a driver that could contain this issue. We have made
    corrections to the samples in our documentation and are working with
    3rd parties, and have included tests for this issue in our driver
    certification program."
    
    Since some network drivers that are certified by Microsoft in their
    latest release of Windows are still exhibiting these issues, NISR
    recommends that Microsoft certification is not taken as a guarantee of
    comprehensive testing.  Instead, a list is provided by CERT at 
    
    http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/412115 of all related hardware and
    software vendors; we would recommend that customers refer to this list
    for the specific hardware vendor to determine exposure to this issue.
    Alternatively, contact the vendor of your networking hardware for
    further information.
    
    
    About NGSSoftware
    *****************
    NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced
    application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom,
    NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of
    Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of
    breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host
    and network security assessments.
    
    http://www.ngssoftware.com/
    http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
    
    Telephone +44 208 401 0070
    Fax +44 208 401 0076
    
    enquiriesat_private
    



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