Qt temporary files race condition in Knoppix 3.1

From: Hugo (overclocking_a_la_abuelaat_private)
Date: Tue Jul 08 2003 - 08:48:51 PDT

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    Qt libaries works with KDE. Knoppix 3.1 comes with KDE3. A default 
    installation on hard disk of this live CD linux distribution with the SSHD 
    daemon running may allow a serious D.o.S. attack and potential root 
    compromise.
    
    I've found a race condition in knoppix 3.1 live CD. I've confirmed it on 2 
    different installations on hard disk done with the "knx-hdinstall" tool.
    Procedure:
    1) After booting knoppix from the CD I set the root passwd
    2) I use knx-hdinstall
    
    Knoppix by default goes to init 5 at startup, so "kdm" is started.
    If you start a session with any user you can see:
    On /tmp you can see a directory ".qt" with this permissions:
    drwxr-xr-x root root 
    Inside /tmp/.qt/ the are two files: "qt_plugins_3.0rc" 
    and "qt_plugins_3.0rc.lock", both owned by root.
    
    The /tmp directory is world writable so it's trivial to exploit this flaw 
    with a symlink attack.
    
    I have exploited it with a ".bash_profile" inside /home/knoppix/ with 
    something like this:
    
    --------------- .bash_profile --------------------
    mkdir /tmp/.qt
    ln -s <file_owned_by_root> /tmp/.qt/qt_plugins3.0rc
    ---------------------------------------------------
    
    All you have to do is waiting for a reboot, then an automated script (I've 
    been able to do it by hand) will try to log in via SSH with "knoppix" user 
    before "kdm" is started (it's really easy) and your bash profile will be 
    loaded. The symlink you created will force the overwriting of 
    <file_owned_by_root>. D.o.S. is trivial: the attacker can overwrite any 
    file in the system.
    
    Exploitation to get root privileges is harder but not imposible. Soon we 
    will have some proof of concept exploit to show potential dangerous 
    scenarios at:
    
    http://www.infohacking.com
    
    Regards,
    
    Hugo Vázquez Caramés
    hugoat_private
    



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