Thanks to IBM for being so receptive with these issues. For those of you that have requested we revive the old "Snosoft" advisories we have begun placing our legacy advisories at http://www.secnetops.biz as time permits. -KF Secure Network Operations, Inc. http://www.secnetops.com Strategic Reconnaissance Team researchat_private Team Lead Contact kfat_private Our Mission: ************************************************************************ Secure Network Operations offers expertise in Networking, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Software Security Validation, and Corporate/Private Network Security. Our mission is to facilitate a secure and reliable Internet and inter-enterprise communications infrastructure through the products and services we offer. Quick Summary: ************************************************************************ Advisory Number : SRT2003-07-07-0913 Product : IBM U2 UniVerse Version : Version <= 10.0.0.9 ? Vendor : http://ibm.com/software/data/u2/universe/ Class : local Criticality : Low Operating System(s) : Only confirmed on Linux (other unix based?) High Level Explanation ************************************************************************ High Level Description : Abnormal suid behavior in several applications What to do : chmod -s /usr/ibm/uv/bin/uvrestore chmod -s /usr/ibm/uv/bin/setacc Technical Details ************************************************************************ Proof Of Concept Status : No PoC necessary Low Level Description : UniVerse is an extended relational database designed for embedding in vertical applications. Its nested relational data model results in intuitive data modeling and fewer resulting tables. UniVerse provides data access, storage and management capabilities across Microsoft® Windows® NT, Linux and UNIplatform. Several several binaries have odd behavior including core dumps and changing permissions on device files. The intent of the below gdb and strace dumps is only to show why we feel these issues are difficult to exploit on linux. We do not feel that we are disclosing Intellectual Property in any way. No anti debug routines are enforced by the below applications. The point is to show what calls are causing the problem. The result could vary on a different unix platform or processor. uvrestore suffers from a command line overflow: (gdb) r `perl -e 'print "A" x 6000'` Starting program: uvrestore `perl -e 'print "A" x 6000'` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0805e81a in basename () (gdb) bt #0 0x0805e81a in basename () #1 0x080619b3 in basename () #2 0x42015574 in libc_start_main () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6 (gdb) i r eax 0x41414141 1094795585 ... [0805e6ec] strcmp("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., "-noindexfix") = 1 [0805e771] strcmp("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., "-") = 1 [0805e7f3] strcpy(0x083b7d00, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"...) = 0x083b7d00 [0805e815] strcpy(0x083b9100, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"...) = 0x083b9100 [0805e81a] --- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) --- uvsetacc does a chmod based on ttyname() results: [root@vegeta bin]# ltrace ./uvsetacc 2557 ttyname(1) = "/dev/pts/1" chmod("/dev/pts/1", 04775) = 0 [kf@vegeta kf]$ ls -al /dev/pts/1 crw------- 1 kf tty 136, 1 Jul 7 21:40 /dev/pts/1 [kf@vegeta kf]$ /usr/ibm/uv/bin/uvsetacc 2557 [kf@vegeta kf]$ ls -al /dev/pts/1 crwsrwxr-x 1 kf tty 136, 1 Jul 7 21:41 /dev/pts/1 --- farfetched - disgruntled helpdesk worker attack scenario --- Helpdesk phone *ring*... uvadm-> hello boss-> my universe program xyz is acting weird uvadm finds boss's tty. *grin* kf pts/1 - 9:42pm 1:02 0.16s 0.16s /bin/bash [uvadm@vegeta uvadm]$ id uid=503(uvadm) gid=503(uvadm) groups=503(uvadm) [uvadm@vegeta uvadm]$ cat /dev/pts/1 cat: /dev/pts/1: Permission denied uvadm-> hrmm try typing this and lets see what happens... "/usr/ibm/uv/bin/uvsetacc 2559" boss-> ok I typed it... now what? uvadm-> do you see the password prompt? [uvadm@vegeta uvadm]$ ls -al /dev/pts/1 crwsrwxrwx 1 kf tty 136, 1 Jul 7 21:48 /dev/pts/1 [uvadm@vegeta uvadm]$ echo Enter Your Universe Password: >> /dev/pts/1 boss-> oh yeah hold on let me type the password in. ... In order to exploit the uvsetacc behvior, you must be logged in as user uvadm. The creation and use of the Unix user 'uvadm' is optional for UniVerse. It is not required for the successfull installation, configuration and administration of UniVerse. The intended use of uvadm is to allow a selected, specific non-root user to perform all aspects of UniVerse administration. Patch or Workaround : chmod -s /usr/ibm/uv/bin/uvrestore chmod -s /usr/ibm/uv/bin/setacc Vendor Status : The IBM U2 staff will have this issue resolved in a future release of IBM U2. Patches may also be supplied on a per client basis at IBM's disgression. Bugtraq URL : to be assigned ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This advisory was released by Secure Network Operations,Inc. as a matter of notification to help administrators protect their networks against the described vulnerability. Exploit source code is no longer released in our advisories. Contact researchat_private for information on how to obtain exploit information.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Jul 16 2003 - 16:22:00 PDT