Cisco Security Advisory: HTTP GET Vulnerability in AP1x00

From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (psirtat_private)
Date: Mon Jul 28 2003 - 09:00:00 PDT

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               Cisco Security Advisory: HTTP GET Vulnerability in AP1x00
    
    Revision 1.0
    
      For Public Release 2003 July 28 16:00 UTC (GMT)
    
         ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Contents
    
         Summary
         Affected Products
         Details
         Impact
         Software Versions and Fixes
         Obtaining Fixed Software
         Workarounds
         Exploitation and Public Announcements
         Status of This Notice: FINAL
         Distribution
         Revision History
         Cisco Security Procedures
    
         ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Summary
    
       A vulnerability has been reported by an external researcher in Cisco
       IOS(R) release for Cisco Aironet AP1x00 Series Wireless devices. The
       vulnerability affects only IOS-based Cisco Aironet Wireless products. The
       VxWorks based Cisco Aironet Wireless Devices are not affected. This
       vulnerability can cause the AP1x00 to reload and is documented as Cisco
       bug ID CSCeb49869 (registered customers only) (also CAN-2003-0511). There
       are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability.
    
       This advisory is posted at
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20030728-ap1x00.shtml.
    
       The external report can be found at
       http://www.vigilante.com/inetsecurity/advisories/VIGILANTE-2003002.htm
       leavingcisco.com. Although it mentions two issues only one is addressed by
       this advisory. The other issue, Cisco bug ID CSCdz29724 (registered
       customers only) (also CAN-2003-512), is present in all IOS software and is
       duplicated by the AP1x00 specific Cisco bug ID CSCeb49842 (registered
       customers only) . More details about it can be found at
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sn-20030724-ios-enum.shtml.
    
    Affected Products
    
       Only the following Cisco IOS-based wireless Access Points are affected:
    
       +------------------------------------------+
       |   Hardware Model   | Software Release(s) |
       |--------------------+---------------------|
       |Cisco Aironet       |12.2(4)JA,           |
       |Wireless Access     |12.2(4)JA1,          |
       |Point AP1100 series |12.2(8)JA, 12.2(11)JA|
       |--------------------+---------------------|
       |Cisco Aironet       |                     |
       |Wireless Access     |12.2(8)JA, 12.2(11)JA|
       |Point AP1200 series |                     |
       |--------------------+---------------------|
       |Cisco Aironet       |                     |
       |Wireless Bridge     |12.2(11)JA           |
       |AP1400 series       |                     |
       +------------------------------------------+
    
       All previous VxWorks-based software releases for Cisco Aironet Access
       Point 1200 are not affected. That includes the following, and earlier,
       software releases: 11.56, 12.01T1, 12.02T1, 12.03T.
    
       In order to determine your software release you should log on the Access
       Point using any account available and execute the following command:
    
     access-point> show ver
    
     Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software
     IOS (tm) C1100 Software (C1100-K9W7-M), Version 12.2(8)JA, EARLY
     DEPLOYMENT RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)               ^^^^^^^^^
     TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
     Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco Systems, Inc.
    
       The Cisco IOS software version is displayed in the second line of the
       output. In this example it is 12.2(8)JA.
    
    Details
    
       Sending a malformed URL to the Cisco Aironet AP1x00 can cause the device
       to reload.
    
    Impact
    
       Repeated exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to a prolonged
       Denial-of-Service (DoS) of the AP1x00.
    
    Software Versions and Fixes
    
       The vulnerability is fixed in the 12.2(11)JA1 version of the software for
       all Cisco Aironet AP1x00 devices.
    
    Obtaining Fixed Software
    
       Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address these vulnerabilities
       for all affected customers. Customers may only install and expect support
       for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading,
       accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
       bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
       http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set
       forth at the Cisco Connection Online Software Center at
       http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
    
       Customers with service contracts should contact their regular update
       channels to obtain the free software upgrade identified via this advisory.
       For most customers with service contracts, this means that upgrades should
       be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
       http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/sw-wireless.shtml. To access the
       software download URL, you must be a registered user and you must be
       logged in.
    
       Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or
       existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
       Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
       support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free
       of charge.
    
       Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
       service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
       but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
       sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
       Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
    
         * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
    
         * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
    
         * e-mail: tacat_private
    
       Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
       notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
       for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
    
       Please do not contact either "psirtat_private" or
       "security-alertat_private" for software upgrades.
    
    Workarounds
    
       There are two workarounds for this vulnerability. One is to use
       access-class or access-list commands to limit the access to legitimate
       hosts only, and another workaround is to disable HTTP and use SSH to
       administer the Cisco Aironet Access Point.
    
       The example of using access-class is given here:
    
     ap(config)# ip http access-class 10
     ap(config)# access-list 10 permit host 10.0.0.1
    
       In this example, host 10.0.0.1 is the only one that is allowed to access
       the AP. All other hosts are prohibited.
    
       To disable HTTP and enable SSH use this example:
    
     ap(config)# no ip http server
     ap(config)# ip domain name <your-domain>
     ap(config)# crypto key generate rsa
     The name for the keys will be: ap.your-domain
     Choose the size of the key modulus in the range of 360 to 2048 for your
      General Purpose Keys. Choosing a key modulus greater than 512 may take
      a few minutes.
    
     How many bits in the modulus [512]: 1024
     % Generating 1024 bit RSA keys ...[OK]
     ap(config)# line vty 0 4
     ap(config-line)# transport input ssh
    
       Now you can connect to the Cisco Aironet AP using SSH client from your
       computer. There are many free and commercial versions of SSH software
       available.
    
       In addition to the workarounds it is possible to mitigate the exposure by
       configuring ACLs on the device so that only legitimate hosts can use the
       http service. This can be done in the following way:
    
     access-list 111 permit tcp host 10.0.0.1 host 10.0.0.50 eq www
    
       In this example the host 10.0.0.1 is the only one that is allowed to
       access the device at 10.0.0.50. You will have to change host IP addresses
       and the ACL number to suit your configuration. This ACL will have to be
       applied to all interfaces and block all IP addresses assigned to the
       affected device.
    
    Exploitation and Public Announcements
    
       This vulnerability is reported by Reda Zitouni from Vigilante. Their
       report can be found at
       http://www.vigilante.com/inetsecurity/advisories/VIGILANTE-2003002.htm
       leavingcisco.com.
    
       The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of malicious use of the vulnerability
       described in this advisory.
    
    Status of This Notice: FINAL
    
       This is a final advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
       all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the
       best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
       this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should
       there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco will update this
       advisory.
    
       A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
       that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
       uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
       errors.
    
    Distribution
    
       This notice will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at .
    
       In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
       clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
       e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
    
         * cust-security-announceat_private
    
         * bugtraqat_private
    
         * full-disclosureat_private
    
         * first-teamsat_private (includes CERT/CC)
    
         * ciscoat_private
    
         * cisco-nspat_private
    
         * comp.dcom.sys.cisco
    
         * Various internal Cisco mailing lists
    
       Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
       worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
       lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to
       check the above URL for any updates.
    
    Revision History
    
       +------------------------------------------+
       |Revision|2003-July-28 16:00 UTC  |Initial |
       |1.0     |(GMT)                   |public  |
       |        |                        |release.|
       +------------------------------------------+
    
    Cisco Security Procedures
    
       Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
       products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
       receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide
       website at
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
       includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
       notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
       http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
    
         ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
       This notice is Copyright 2003 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
       redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
       provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and
       include all date and version information.
    
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