Solaris ld.so.1 buffer overflow

From: Jouko Pynnonen (joukoat_private)
Date: Tue Jul 29 2003 - 13:36:18 PDT

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    OVERVIEW
    ========
    
    There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solaris runtime linker, 
    /lib/ld.so.1. A local user can gain elevated privileges if there are
    any dynamically linked, executable SUID/SGID programs in the 
    filesystem.
    
    On a typical Solaris installation most or all SUID/SGID programs are 
    dynamically linked. The trend has been to completely move towards 
    dynamically linked binaries due to Sun's recommendation. Support for 
    static binaries will be removed in Solaris 10.
    
    
    
    DETAILS
    =======
    
    The environment variable LD_PRELOAD is used to force ld.so.1 to load 
    the specified library during runtime linking. If a setuid or setgid 
    program is being loaded, the value of this variable is checked to 
    prevent a potential malicious user-defined library to be linked in. In 
    this case the linker only accepts libraries located under certain 
    trusted directories. The code doing this evaluation is most likely the 
    point containing the "unchecked buffer".
    
    The buffer overflow happens if the LD_PRELOAD value starts and ends 
    with a slash and contains about 1200 characters. An exploit won't be 
    presented here, but the existance of the vulnerability can be tested 
    like this:
    
      $ LD_PRELOAD=/`perl -e 'print "A"x2000'` passwd
      ld.so.1: passwd: warning /AAAAAAA ... AAAAA/: open failed: illegal 
      insecure pathname
      Segmentation Fault (core dumped)
    
    My test exploit for Solaris 9 / SPARC gets a root shell by setting 
    the variable and starting /usr/bin/passwd. The exploit builds a fake 
    stack frame and causes the linker to return to libc in order to defeat 
    the nonexecutable stack protection. I haven't produced an exploit for 
    Intel platform, but according to Sun the vulnerability exists on both 
    platforms.
    
    
    
    SOLUTION
    ========
    
    Sun Microsystems was contacted on June 1st, 2003 and has released a fix 
    for the flaw. A complete list of vulnerable Solaris versions and the 
    fix can be found here:
    
      http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert/55680
    
    
    
    CREDITS
    =======
    
    The vulnerability was discovered by Jouko Pynnönen, Finland.
    
    
    
    -- 
    Jouko Pynnonen          http://iki.fi/jouko/
    joukoat_private
    



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