ePolicy Orchestrator multiple vulnerabilities

From: @stake Advisories (@stake)
Date: Thu Jul 31 2003 - 10:58:01 PDT

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                               @stake, Inc.
                             www.atstake.com
    
                            Security Advisory
    
    Advisory Name: ePolicy Orchestrator multiple vulnerabilities
     Release Date: 07/31/2003
      Application: McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator 2.X and 3.0
         Platform: Windows
         Severity: Remote code execution
           Author: Andreas Junestam [andreasat_private]
    Vendor Status: Vendor had bulletin and patch
    CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0148, CAN-2003-0149, CAN-2003-0616
        Reference: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a073103-1.txt
    
    
    Overview:
    
         McAfee Security ePolicy Orchestrator
    (http://www.mcafeeb2b.com/ products/epolicy/default-desktop-
    protection.asp [line wrapped]) is an enterprise antivirus management
    tool.  ePolicy Orchestrator is a policy driven deployment and
    reporting tool for enterprise administrators to effectivley manage
    their desktop and server antivirus products.
    
    Three vulnerabilities exist in the ePolicy Server and Agent
    that allows an attacker to anonymously execute arbitrary code. To
    attack a machine running ePO, an attacker would typically need to
    be located within the corporate firewall and be able to connect over
    the network to the host they wish to compromise. Once one of the
    vulnerability is successfully exploited the attacker can execute
    arbitrary code under the privileges used by ePO. SYSTEM is the
    default.
    
    Details:
    
         The ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) is built upon a client / server
    solution with Agents running on all client hosts. This allows all
    installation and administration of antivirus software to be
    centralized to one host. To achive this, ePO relies on three parts:
    Server, Agents and MSDE (to store configuration information). All
    services are by default installed to run as SYSTEM on the host and
    thus can be used to either elevate local privileges or remotely
    compromise the host.
    
    @stake has discovered 3 different vulnerabilities in the ePO
    solution. 2 vulnerabilies concern the server and 1 concerns
    the agent.
    
    Server Issue #1
    
    MSDE SA account compromise - This vulnerability applies to ePO 2.X
    and 3.0 and is divided up into 3 different parts, that combined
    allows an attacker to execute code on the host.
    
    Information disclosure - By issuing a properly formatted HTTP
    request to the ePO Server, it will respond with the server config
    file. This config file contains username and encrypted password
    for the database administrator of the MSDE installation.
    
    Weak cryptography implementation - The encrypted password stored
    in the ePO Server config file is encrypted with a DES variant and a
    secret key. The secret key is stored in a dll, making decryption of
    the password an easy task.
    
    Default MSDE installation - The installation of MSDE is not
    hardened, so once the attacker has the database administrator
    username and password, he can execute OS commands as SYSTEM
    through xp_cmdshell.
    
    Server Issue #2
    
    ComputerList format string vulnerability - This vulnerability
    applies to ePO 2.X. Sending a POST request to the Server where the
    ComputerList parameter contains a few format characters will cause
    the service to crash when it tries to log a failed name resolution.
    A properly constucted malicious string containing format string
    characters will allow the execution of arbitrary code.
    
    Client Issue #1
    
    ePO Agent Heap Overflow - This vulnerability applies to ePO 2.X.
    Sending a POST request to the Agent where parameters on the URL are
    substituted by a large number of A's will cause the service to
    crash. A properly formatted request will allow an attacker to
    overwrite arbitrary data and thus execute code.
    
    
    Vendor Response:
    
    Initial contact: March 15, 2003
    Confirmed issues: March 31, 2003
    Fix available: July 31, 2003
    
    NAI has released a bulletin and a patch that resolves these
    issues.  Bulletin:
    
    http://www.nai.com/us/promos/mcafee/epo_vulnerabilities.asp
    
    
    @stake Recommendation:
    
    When deploying new security products within the enterprise,
    organizations should understand the risks that new security
    solutions may introduce.  Does the service need to be running as
    the SYSTEM user? Does the service need to be accessed anonymously
    from any machine?  Usually the answer is no.  Products should
    be configured to use the least privilege required and only
    send and recieve network data to the required machines.
    
    @stake recommends installing the vendor patch. 
    
    
    Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
    
    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has
    assigned the following names to these issues.  These are candidates
    for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which
    standardizes names for security problems.
    
    CAN-2003-0148 ePolicy Orchestrator MSDE SA account compromise
    CAN-2003-0149 ePolicy Orchestrator 2.x Post Parameters Heap Overflow
    CAN-2003-0616 ePolicy Orchestrator 2.x Computerlist format string
    
    
    @stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/
    
    @stake Advisory Archive:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/
    
    PGP Key:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc
    
    
    @stake is currently seeking application security experts to fill
    several consulting positions.  Applicants should have strong
    application development skills and be able to perform application
    security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration
    testing.  Please send resumes to jobsat_private
    
    
    Copyright 2003 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.
    
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