Very Very good explanation of Concept/Nimda worm propagation

From: victoria.evans@private
Date: Tue Sep 18 2001 - 22:58:43 PDT

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    Nimda is a complex mass-mailer, network worm and virus. It is a 57kb PE DLL
    file with an EXE extension.
    
    When run the worm first checks the name of the file it was run from. If the
    name of worm's file is ADMIN.DLL, the worm creates a mutex with
    'fsdhqherwqi2001' name, copies itself as MMC.EXE into \Windows\ directory
    and starts this file with '-qusery9bnow' command line. If the worm is
    started from README.EXE file (or a file that has more than 5 symbols in its
    name and EXE extension) the worm copies itself to temporary folder with a
    random name and runs itself there with '-dontrunold' command line option.
    
    If the worm is run for the first time (as README.EXE) it loads itself as a
    library, looks for some resource there and checks its size. If the resource
    size is less than 100, the worm unloads itself, otherwise the worm checks
    if it was launched from a hard drive and deletes its file in case it was
    launched from other type of media. If the worm's file that is delete is
    locked, the worm creates WININIT.INI file that will delete the worm's file
    on next Windows startup. If the worm was launched from a hard drive, it
    checks one of its resources, extracts it to a file and launches it.
    Checking the resource size is done to be able to detect if a worm runs from
    and infected EXE file. In this case the original executable part is
    extracted and run by the worm to disguise its presence.
    
    Then the worm gets current time and generates a random number. After
    performing multiplication and division with this number the worm checks the
    result. If a result is bigger than worm's counter, the worm starts to
    search and delete README*.EXE files in temporary folder.
    
    The worm tries to create the
    [SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces] key in
    the Registry. It also queries 'NameServer' value from
    [System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\MSTCP] key. After that the worm
    updates its resources and deletes and re-creates its file. If the file is
    locked, the worm creates WININIT.INI file that will delete the previously
    locked file on next Windows startup.
    
    After that the worm prepares its MIME-encoded copy by extracting a
    pre-defined multi-partite message from its body and appending its
    MIME-encoded copy to it. The file with a random name is created in
    temporary folder.
    
    The worm looks for EXPLORER process, opens it and assigns its process as
    remote thread of Explorer. Then the worm gets API creates a mutex with
    'fsdhqherwqi2001' name, startups Winsock services, gets an infected
    computer (host) info and sleeps for some time. When resumed, the worm
    checks what platform it is running. If it is running on NT-based system, it
    compacts its memory blocks to occupy less space in memory and copies itself
    as LOAD32.EXE to Windows system directory. Then it modifies SYSTEM.INI file
    by adding the following string after SHELL= variable in [Boot] section:
    
    
     explorer.exe load.exe -dontrunold
    
    This will start the worm's copy every time Windows starts. The worm also
    copies itself as RICHED32.DLL file to system folder and sets hidden and
    system attributes to this file as well as to LOAD.EXE file. Then the worm
    enumerates shared network resources and scarts to recursively scan files on
    remote systems. If the worm finds an EXE file on a remote system, it reads
    the file, deletes it and then writes a new file where the worm body is
    placed first and the original EXE file is present as a resource. Later when
    this affected file will be run, the worm will extract the EXE file resource
    and run it. The worm checks the file name for 'WinZip32.exe' and doesn't
    affect this file if it is found.
    
    When searching for files in remote systems the worm collects names of DOC
    files and then copies its file to folders where DOC files are located with
    RICHED32.DLL name. The copied file has system and hidden attributes. This
    is done to increase the chances of worm activation on remote systems as
    Windows' original RICHED32.DLL component is used to open OLE files. But
    instead the worm's RICHED32.DLL file will be launched as Windows first
    checks current directory for needed DLLs.
    
    Also when the worm browsing the remote computers' directories it creates
    .EML and .NWS (rarely) files that have the names of document files that the
    worm could find on a remote system. These .EML and .NWS files are worm's
    multi-partite messages with a worm MIME-encoded in them. When scanning the
    worm can also delete the .EML and .NWS files it previously created.
    
    The worm adjusts the properties of Windows Explorer, it accesses
    [Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced] key and
    adjusts 'Hidden', 'ShowSuperHidden' and 'HideFileExt' keys. This affects
    Windows' (especially ME and 2000) ability to show hidden files - worm's
    files will not be seen in Explorer any more.
    
    After that the worm adds a 'guest'account to infected system account list,
    activates this account, adds it to 'Administrator' and 'Guests' groups and
    shares C:\ drive with full access priviledges. The worm also deletes all
    subkeys from
    [SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\Shares\Security] key to
    disable sharing security.
    
    The worm accesses[SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths] key
    reads subkeys from there and affects all files listed in the subkeys the
    same way it does affect remote EXE files (see above). The worm doesn't only
    infect WinZip32.exe file. Also the worm reads user's personal folders from
    [Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders] key and
    infects files in these folders as well.
    
    Finally the worm starts to search local hard drives for HTML, .ASP, and
    .HTM files and also for files with 'DEFAULT', 'INDEX', 'MAIN' and 'README'
    words in their filenames and if such files are found, the worm creates
    README.EML file (which is the multi-partite message with MIME-encoded worm)
    in the same directory and adds a small JavaScript code to the end of found
    files. That JavaScript code would open README.EML file when the infected
    HTML file is loaded by a web browser. As a result the MIME-encoded worm
    will get activated because of asecurity hole and a system will get
    infected. It should be noted that the worm will not always do the above
    described operation, it depends on a random number the worm generates prior
    to this action.
    
    The worm's file runs from a minimized window when downloaded from an
    infected webserver. This technique affects userswho are browsing the web
    with Internet Explorer 5.0 or 5.01.
    
     E-Mail spreading:
    
    The worm searches trough all the '.htm' and '.html' file in the Temporary
    Internet Files folder for e-mail addresses. It reads through user's inbox
    and collects the sender addresses. When the address list is ready it uses
    it's own SMTP engine to send the infected messages.
    
     IIS spreading:
    
    The worm uses backdoors on IIS servers such as the one CodeRed II installs.
    It scans random IP addresses for these backdoors. When a host is found to
    have one, the worm instructs the machine to download the worm code
    (Admin.dll) from the host used for scanning. After this it executes the
    worm on the target machine this way infecting it.
    
    The worm has a copyright text string that is never displayed:
    
    Concept Virus(CV) V.5, Copyright(C)2001 R.P.China
    
    
    It should be said that the worm has bugs that cause crashes or inability to
    spread itself in certain conditions.
    



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