CRIME (g2i) A Compilation of Evidence and Comments on the Source of the Mailed Anthrax

From: Goerling, Richard J. LT (TAD to CGIC Portland) (RIGoerling@private)
Date: Mon Nov 19 2001 - 08:16:07 PST

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    A Compilation of Evidence and Comments on the Source of the Mailed Anthrax 
      Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, 12 Nov 01 
    
    
      1.  ANTHRAX STRAIN 
      --All letter samples are the same, and correspond to AMES in the N.
    Arizona State University database (which has been used for 
    identification).  That Ames sample was obtained from Porton Down (UK) in the
    mid-90's (the sample was marked "October 1932"); Porton had 
    gotten it from USAMRIID. 
      --Many anthrax strains were isolated by labs in Ames, Iowa starting with
    one in 1928.  There is much confusion about who has which sub-strain 
    or which one is meant by "Ames." 
      --A 2000 paper by M. Hugh-Jones, PJ Jackson, P. Keim et al says that the
    Ames strain played a central role in the US BW program. 
    Hugh-Jones says he learned that from David Huxsoll (Former Commander,
    USAMRIID).  He also says Vollum 1B was the strain stockpiled. 
      --USAMRIID claims to have obtained the "Ames" strain around 1980 from the
    USDA lab in Ames, Iowa.  They don't know when it was isolated. 
    They did transfer the strain to Porton in the '80s.  They claim have no
    information about the Ames strain prior to 1980. 
      --The Ames strain is highly virulent and is used now in the US biodefense
    program for testing vaccines etc. 
      --The Ames strain recurred in nature in 1997 on a Texas goat farm. 
    
    
      2.  WEAPONIZATION 
      --The form in the senate letter:  fine particles, very narrow size range
    (1.5-3 microns diameter), treated so it won't clump and will float. 
      --An ABC reporter who writes on anthrax vaccine has privately confirmed
    that four labs have told him that under the electron microscope the 
    sample looks just like material obtained by UNSCOM in Iraq.  The Iraqi
    material was spray-dried BT.  I have been told that such particles are 
    distinguishable from milled particles.  The US process did not use milling. 
      --The senate sample contains silica, a drying agent used in the US
    process, and not bentonite (used by the Iraqis) 
      --The US weaponization process is secretBill Patrick, its inventor, says
    it involves a COMBINATION of chemicals.  Therefore, further analysis 
    should be able to determine whether or not the process used to make the
    letter anthrax was identical to the US secret process. 
    
    
      All the available information is consistent with a US government lab as
    the source, either of the anthrax itself or of the recipe for the US 
    weaponization process. 
    
    
      3.  TESTS IN PROGRESS? 
      --A study of genetic drift at certain locations in anthrax is said to be
    underway at Northern Arizona State Univ.  This will give an idea of how 
    many times the letter anthrax replicated, in comparison to the reference
    strainie, whether it was grown on a very large scale (as in a State 
    program) or on a very small scale, as would be likely if recently made by a
    terrorist. 
      --Analysis of trace contaminants could be used to determine the method of
    production. 
      --Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said
    that 30-40 labs in US and perhaps 100 worldwide could have 
    produced the anthrax mailed Daschle.  Investigators can identify with great
    certainty which lab produced the anthrax, Graham said, but it will be a 
    laborious, time-consuming process. (Chicago Tribune, 27 Oct 01). 
    
    
      4.  LETTER ANALYSIS 
      --Analysts believe the letters were not written by a Middle-Easterner.
    The FBI now conjectures that the perpetrator was a lone domestic terrorist 
    (obviously one with a scientific background and lab experience who could
    handle hazardous materials). 
    
    
      5.  TIMING 
      --There was only 1 week between 11 Sept and Sept. 18th, when the first two
    letters (and probably a letter, never found, to AMI) were 
    postmarked.  This suggests that the anthrax was already in hand before Sept
    11. 
      --Did the perpetrator have advance knowledge of the Sept 11 attacks?
    Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has said that he does not believe al- 
    Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax attack, and other public officials
    have increasingly indicated that the perpetrator was probably domestic. 
    
    
      6.  PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
      -- 
      AT FIRST, US officials provided miscellaneous bits of information, some
    conflicting; then denied some of the earlier information, then clammed 
    up.  Chances are they know more than they want to say.  They are clearly
    concentrating on domestic investigations, however (the US even 
    rejected a UN resolution condemning the anthrax attack, on the grounds that
    it might have been domestic terrorism). 
      --The Secretary of Health and Human Services said that some of the
    relevant information is classified, and some is restricted by the FBI. 
    
    
      7.  SPECULATION 
      --The perpetrator was not only an American scientist but one with access
    to US weaponized anthrax or one who had been taught by an expert 
    how to make it. 
      --An astute observer has pointed out that the letters warned of anthrax or
    the need to take antibiotics, making it possible for those who handled 
    the letters to protect themselves; and that it seems unlikely that the
    perpetrator would have anticipated that the rough treatment of mail in
    letter 
    sorters etc, would force anthrax spores through the pores of the envelopes
    (which were taped to keep the anthrax inside) and infect postal 
    workers.  It is therefore possible that the perpetrator's goal was not
    necessarily to kill but to create public fear, in order to raise the profile
    of BW 
    for some reason, and that he simply took advantage of Sept 11 to throw
    suspicion elsewhere. 
    
    
      MORE DETAILED SPECULATION 
    
    
      1.  The perpetrator was a microbiologist who had, or once had, access to
    weaponized anthrax in a US government lab.  Perhaps he had a vial 
    or two in his basement as a keepsake.  He does not necessarily live in or
    near Trenton!  Trenton is a stop on the Amtrack line that runs along the 
    East coast.  If he is smart enough to handle anthrax he is smart enough not
    to mail it from his home town. 
    
    
      2.  The letter anthrax was made and weaponized in a US government lab,
    either before Nixon terminated the US BW program in 1969, or later, 
    for biodefense purposes. 
    
    
              --If the sample was made before 1969, then the Ames reference
    strain in the N. Arizona collection (which matches the letter sample) would 
    have to be an early Ames substrain, probably 1928.  Although Vollum was the
    main strain stockpiled by the US, at least during WWII, it is not 
    unlikely that the search continued for better strains, and that the US BW
    program later switched to Ames, which is considerably more virulent 
    than Vollum. 
    
    
              --If the letter sample was made more recently it could be a later
    Ames substrain, eg, 1980.  But weaponization of dry anthrax after 1972, 
    when the BWC was signed, could be construed as a violation of the BWC. 
    
    
              --The confusion about Ames substrains might have been cleared up
    if Iowa State had not destroyed the original isolates recently; but now it 
    is probably only USAMRIID that knows the key.  When questioned, they were
    evasive.  It seems probable that retired USAMRIID Commanders 
    and consulting anthrax experts have also been asked to stop talking.  Most
    likely USAMRIID has had both the 1928 and 1980 Ames substrains 
    for a long time, and is not willing to say which one was transferred to
    Porton in the '80s (ie, which one is the N. Arizona reference strain, which 
    came from Porton and matches the letter anthrax). 
    
    
      3.  Clumping:  All the letters may have contained the same material.  The
    clumping of the anthrax in the two letters mailed on Sept 18 (to NBC 
    and the NY Post) might have resulted from the letters getting wet in the
    course of mail processing or delivery, or the perpetrator might have 
    deliberately caused it to clump.  In addition, some filler might have been
    added to those two letters.  Analysis has probably already answered 
    these questions and more. 
    
    
      4.  The motive of the perpetrator may have been to attract attention to
    biological weapons as a threat, either to push the US government toward 
    retaliatory action against some enemy or to attract funding and recognition
    to some agency/company/program/etc. with which he has a 
    connection.  The choice of media and the Senate leader as targets fits these
    motives. 
      --The perpetrator may not even have intended to kill anyone.  The postmark
    on the Daschle letter is difficult to read.  It has been reported as 
    Oct. 8 in one NY Times article and Oct 9 in another.  On the FBI website it
    looks more like 3 or 5 Oct to some observers.  It is possible that the 
    perpetrator did not know of the first anthrax case (in Florida), which was
    first reported at about 4 pm on Oct. 4, when he mailed the last letter (to 
    Daschle). 
    
    
      5.  If the US government suspects or knows that the anthrax was an
    "inside" job, it would probably want to cover it up that politically 
    embarrassing information for the time being and gradually suggest the truth,
    as seems to be happening. 
    
    
    Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, PhD 
    Natural Sciences 
    SUNY 
    Purchase, NY 10577  USA 
    tel. 1-914 251 6643 
    fax 1-914 251 6635 
    barbarar@private 
    barbara@private 
    



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