Re: CRIME Article on Magic Lantern from ZDNET

From: Crispin Cowan (crispin@private)
Date: Sat Dec 08 2001 - 13:44:57 PST

  • Next message: Alan: "Re: CRIME Article on Magic Lantern from ZDNET"

    Alan wrote:
    
    >>Dr.
    >>Crispie's recomended recipies for proper authentication:
    >>
    >>    * Never use plain old passwords sent in the clear. Common examples
    >>      include:
    >>          * telnet
    >>          * non-SSL web forms
    >>
    >Also "authenticated pages" on web sites that use "Basic Authentication". The 
    >password is encoded, not encrypted. (Base-64, if I remember correctly.)
    >
    I'm not familiar with "Basic Authentication"; how would I know when 
    someone is pushing it at me?
    
    >Also avoid protocols that have been broken, like 802.11b wireless encryption.
    >
    Just assume that the transitive closure of all machines connected to 
    802.11b are outside of your firewall, and you'll be fine :-) Firewalls 
    have had degrading security values for years, and 802.11b is a great big 
    pothole in their security value.  It is hugely convenient to wire an 
    office with WaveLAN, but (since 802.11b authentication was cracked) it 
    is now impractical to firewall such a LAN. Therefore, all machines that 
    are on a network that has 802.11b on it should:
    
        * use VPNs or crypto tunnels such as SSH for anything sensitive
        * be "naked on the Internet" secure against attack
    
    Anyone wanna buy an Immunix system? :-)
    
    >Unless the server is comprimised.  They you are SOL. 
    >
    Agreed.  Buy Immunix :-)
    
    >I thought they found weaknesses in SecureID.  i will have to check my 
    >archives.
    >
    They did, but it's pretty arcane. With a big pile of hardware, you can 
    extract the private key from a stolen secureID card, based on watching 
    the chip's power consumption as it does the thousand-bit multiplies for 
    RSA modular exponentiation. Practical solution: freak out if a user 
    reports a card stolen and revoke their key on all your servers. You can 
    probably get this done before the attacker cracks the card.
    
    >There are also hardware ID devices like iButton and smart card authentication 
    >combined.
    >
    There are also USB dongles that claim to be secure storage for PKI keys. 
    However, I'm unclear on how the human authenticates to the iButton or 
    the dongle. If there is no such authentication, then the attacker can 
    just steal the token to get access, i.e. it's not really 2-factor. 
    Anyone actually tried one? Is there a 2nd factor to authenticate the 
    human to the token?
    
    Crispin
    
    -- 
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.
    Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com
    Security Hardened Linux Distribution:       http://immunix.org
    Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html
    



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