you could always drop off your ballot directly at the elections office like i do. i'm not saying that it is a perfect system but at the very least it's better than the jackaninny diebold system. Crispin Cowan wrote: > Marc Schuette wrote: > >> signatures on the outside envelope are matched on all ballots and if >> there is a non-matching sig the elections office will notify that >> person of the error . > > > So it would be hard to file fake or duplicate ballots. > >> the secrecy envelopes are opened under observation and there is no >> way to identify a ballot (dem/repub/other) at this point - after they >> are opened they are fed through the counting machines and tabulated. > > > And it would be hard for a vote counter to selectively count ballots; > to be expected. > >> you can call the elections office and they can tell you if you were >> sent a ballot and if they received a ballot back from you - they >> cannot tell you how you voted only if they got a ballot from you >> (there is an assumption that it was counted correctly if you did NOT >> hear from teh elections office that your ballot was NOT counted). > > > This doesn't fly: Americans barely vote at all (pitiful 50% turn-outs) > and they certainly are not going to verify ballot receipt via phone in > any significant volume. This leaves the system wide open to the > previously mentioned attacks of "losing" ballots from selected counties. > >> just some general broad strokes but it seems there are multiple >> checkpoints where fraud MIGHT be discovered. you (anyone) can observe >> this process during a ballot count. call the elections offices and >> ask to go on a tour that night. > > > Tours don't work, because that is not where the threat occurs. The > problem is that ballots are submitted via UDP datagram (no > verification of receipt) and the attacker can see the source IP address. > > Crispin >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Sep 11 2003 - 15:33:40 PDT