-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Interesting question. I'm forced to wonder this myself. t > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-isn@private > [mailto:owner-isn@private] On Behalf Of InfoSec News > Sent: Thursday, December 11, 2003 1:07 AM > To: isn@private > Subject: Re: [ISN] Voting-Machine Makers To Fight Security Criticism > > > Forwarded from: Henry Schwan <owlswan@private> > > An important question to be asked is if all the other electronic > machines that Diebold and others make leave a paper trail, why was the > paper trail in voting machines specifically left out. See: > > No Confidence Vote: Why the Current Touch Screen Voting Fiasco Was > Pretty Much Inevitable > > <http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20031204.html> > > -----snip---- > > Now here's the really interesting part. Forgetting for a moment > Diebold's voting machines, let's look at the other equipment they > make. Diebold makes a lot of ATM machines. They make machines that > sell tickets for trains and subways. They make store checkout > scanners, including self-service scanners. They make machines that > allow access to buildings for people with magnetic cards. They make > machines that use magnetic cards for payment in closed systems like > university dining rooms. All of these are machines that involve data > input that results in a transaction, just like a voting machine. But > unlike a voting machine, every one of these other kinds of Diebold > machines -- EVERY ONE -- creates a paper trail and can be audited. > Would Citibank have it any other way? Would Home Depot? Would the > CIA? Of course not. These machines affect the livelihood of their > owners. If they can't be audited they can't be trusted. If they > can't be trusted they won't be used. > > Now back to those voting machines. If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you > make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to > include such a capability in the voting machines, too? Given that > what you are doing is adapting existing technology to a new purpose, > wouldn't it be logical to carry over to voting machines this > capability that is so important in every other kind of transaction > device? > > This confuses me. I'd love to know who said to leave the feature out > and why? > > Next week: the answer. > > InfoSec News wrote: > > > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47436-2003Dec8.html > > > > By Jonathan Krim > > Washington Post Staff Writer > > December 9, 2003 > > > > Electronic-voting-machine companies announced yesterday that they > > are banding together to counter mounting concerns about whether > > their machines are secure enough to withstand tampering by hackers. > > > -- > Sincerely, > > Henry Schwan > Paralegal > Electronic Frontier Foundation > > > > - > ISN is currently hosted by Attrition.org > > To unsubscribe email majordomo@private with 'unsubscribe isn' > in the BODY of the mail. > "I have gone to great lengths to expand my threshold of pain" - -Tool -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify Version: Hush 2.3 wkYEARECAAYFAj/ZjdsACgkQgmQPhCwzFyDE4wCcCIy0JiWMeBuEHVouWSjZTJmGgwsA oLrpSKwDNcTFjo0U2TwwNv42NZFR =I0d8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get FREE encrypted email: https://www.hushmail.com/?l=2 Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger https://www.hushmail.com/services.php?subloc=messenger&l=434 Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program: https://www.hushmail.com/about.php?subloc=affiliate&l=427
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Dec 12 2003 - 02:44:36 PST