It's just easier to use. You can use the unicode bug to execute cmd.exe from any directory with execute permissions, but copying cmd to a file in /scripts/ has the ease of use of not having to worry about the unicode and cmd, so you can execute commands on it without (at least, that's their hope) triggering an IDS, or the admin noticing REALLY strange entries in the log. Maybe the only partially strange logs won't tip them off. Plus, there's the added benefit that even when patches are installed in the machine, the hacker has easy access right in because no unicode is necessary to use dr.exe. Again, assuming that dr.exe really is cmd.exe. -- Jordan Wiens UF Network Incident Response Team (352)392-2061 On Wed, 25 Jul 2001, Joe Smith wrote: > Lee, > > Very likely, they copied winnt\system32\cmd.exe to > \scripts\dr.exe. If you check file sizes and dates > modified, they should be identical. The reason why is > because they cannot run cmd.exe from the system32 > directory, they have to run it from the scripts folder > (I think. Can anyone else confirm this?). > > If dr.exe is vastly different than cmd.exe, then I've > got no clue. > > -smith > > --- Lee Evans <leeat_private> wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > Any advice would be much appreciated - a couple of > > our boxes seem to have > > been exploited using a directory traversal > > vulnerabiltiy, by uploading a file > > called "dr.exe", and then passing this commands to > > remove files from the box. > > > > I have recovered our logfiles and the data > > fortunately, and I am still > > examining the log's. > > > > Is this dr.exe thing a known attack, (I can't seem > > to find anything about > > it).? > > > > The attacked boxes did have all the latest patches > > applied to them, and I > > double checked this during the code red crisis, and > > applied any that were > > missing. > > > > Any information would be much appreciated. > > > > Regards > > Lee > > - -- > > Lee Evans > > Vital Online Ltd > > > > This message is intended only for the use of the > > person(s) ("The > > intended recipient(s)") to whom it is addressed. > > It may contain > > information which is privileged and confidential > > within the > > meaning of applicable law. If you are not the > > intended recipient, > > please contact the sender as soon as possible. The > > views expressed > > in this communication may not necessarily be the > > views held by Vital Online > > Ltd. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) > > Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org > > > > > iD8DBQE7XpKrhtUFQXeFbZYRAh0mAKCTpYRfp5m/MBHHc/tvYYdxMqf9qQCeNpru > > +QqVQuyw/IhvuMQfwnP7lhc= > > =Zel8 > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS > > analyzer service. > > For more information on this free incident handling, > > management > > and tracking system please see: > > http://aris.securityfocus.com > > > > > __________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > Make international calls for as low as $.04/minute with Yahoo! Messenger > http://phonecard.yahoo.com/ > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. > For more information on this free incident handling, management > and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Jul 25 2001 - 14:16:30 PDT