Re: Possible method to prevent spread of CodeRed and other similar worms

From: Chris Brenton (cbrentonat_private)
Date: Wed Aug 01 2001 - 13:53:29 PDT

  • Next message: Michael Tavares: "Re: Code Red hits"

    dave.goldsmithat_private wrote:
    > 
    > Is there normally any reason for a web server to initiate OUTBOUND
    > connections to the Internet?  If not, why not block such outbound packets?
    
    <shameless plug>
    This is exactly what I preach in my security course. :)
    </shameless plug>
    
    Most of us have some form of DMZ/service network which contain publicly
    accessible systems. If you look at the connectivity needs of each
    (commentary is in reference to the direction of connection
    establishment):
    
    DNS server = Inbound UDP/53, possibly TCP/53. Outbound UDP/53 and
    TCP/53. 
    
    Mail server = Outbound TCP/25. Inbound TCP/25. 
    Possibly inbound and outbound TCP/113 if Auth is used)
    
    Web server = Inbound TCP/80. Possible inbound TCP/443.
    
    Obviously some environments may vary a bit from this. For example my
    systems create additional connections for syslog and NTP but this is to
    only specific IP addresses. You may also need to support inbound SSH
    (TCP/22) for management.
    
    So given the above known types of acceptable connectivity, what if your
    Web server starts generating outbound TCP/80, TCP/21 and/or TCP/22
    sessions? This is a pretty good indication that the box has been
    whacked. Not only should you block this traffic, but IMHO it should set
    off every alarm you have so the reason for the traffic can be addressed
    ASAP.
    
    > If an IIS (or any other) web server were to become infected with a worm that
    > then tried to spread, that system would be blocked from sending out viral
    > traffic.
    
    Agreed. By implementing the above you:
    1) Get a heads up that the box has been whacked
    2) Stop your system from attacking other systems
    
    In the case of a manual compromise, you may even prevent the purp from
    yanking down a rootkit which keeps the amount of damage actually caused
    by the intrusion at a recoverable level.
    
    HTH,
    Chris
    -- 
    **************************************
    cbrentonat_private
    
    $ chown -R us:us yourbase
    
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