Re: Nimda esponsibility - Laying appropriatel - implied warranty of sale

From: Jay D. Dyson (jdysonat_private)
Date: Fri Sep 28 2001 - 10:30:18 PDT

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    On Fri, 28 Sep 2001, Chip Mefford wrote:
    
    > > I see one problem as how to recompense those who have been
    > > harmed. 
    > 
    > How about this, 
    > 
    > Welcome to the Internet;
    > No warranties expressed or implied, 
    > use at YOUR OWN RISK.
    
    	This argument is myopic at best, fundamentally illogical at worst. 
    The people who are running insecure systems are doing little but fouling
    the nest for the rest of us.  I have absolutely no complaint about
    defending my systems...but when the insecurity of other systems renders
    the networks unusuable, that's when I draw the line.
    
    	Let me put this in real-life terms: my upstream was infested (not
    just infected...INFESTED) with Code Red since the very start.  After
    getting close to one thousand scans from Code Red systems on the same
    Class B as my own, I made it a point to alert the upstream about the
    problem on a realtime basis (hence, Early Bird).
    
    	Positive results gradually came to pass, but not in sufficient
    quantity by the time Nimda hit on September 18th.  At that point, my
    upstream was overwhelmed by the traffic generated by the worm (courtesy of
    the uncaring and/or incompetent IIS admins).  ARP storms turned into
    blizzards; routers began crashing faster than they could be brought up. 
    
    	And the "solution" of the upstream?  All traffic on port 80 --
    both inbound and outbound -- was BLOCKED. 
    
    	So, thanks to a bunch of uncaring (if not incompetent) admins who
    couldn't manage their own systems, *my* systems were knocked off the 'net
    for close to 24 hours.  Mind you, NONE of my systems were vulnerable; NONE
    were infected; NONE were spreading the worm.  Even so, both myself and my
    users (not to mention the security teams for which I work) had to suffer
    the blackout that was wholly the end product of the [in]actions of the
    incompetents.
    
    	Anyone who argues that the innocent should pay the price for the
    conduct of the guilty should get their head examined.  Normally, I would
    gladly volunteer to perform this task, but my chainsaw is presently out
    for maintenance. 
    
    - -Jay
    
      (    (                                                         _______
      ))   ))   .-"There's always time for a good cup of coffee."-.   >====<--.
    C|~~|C|~~| (>------ Jay D. Dyson - jdysonat_private ------<) |    = |-'
     `--' `--'  `--------------- rm -rf /bin/laden ---------------'  `------'
    
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