RE: slowing down the spread of worms

From: Rob Keown (Keownat_private)
Date: Sun Sep 30 2001 - 16:57:44 PDT

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    While this thread is a little off-topic, here is an interesting idea. We
    have a Labrea machine on a few of our Class C's with available addresses.
    I'm curious what other's might think or any "proof-of-concept" out there.
    
    http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/firewalls/2001-q3/1091.html
    
    Rob Keown
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Nathan W. Labadie [mailto:ab0781at_private]
    Sent: Sunday, September 30, 2001 5:33 PM
    To: incidentsat_private
    Subject: slowing down the spread of worms
    
    
    Is anyone else using the "flexible response" feature of snort to slow 
    down the spread of recent worms? I've been testing it and so far it 
    appears to be extremely effective. More information here:
    
    http://www.snort.org/docs/writing_rules/chap2.html#tth_sEc2.3.22
    
    I'm currently running snort against a mirror of all the traffic for two 
    class b subnets (academic environment). Ever since the release of 
    codered, attempting to keep up with the number of IIS-related alerts is 
    impossible. There simply isn't the resources to parse through 100,000+ 
    alerts at the end of the day. An unpatches IIS machine placed on the 
    network would usually become infected with either nimda or codered 
    within 6-12 hours. Using "flexible response" seems to be a feasable way 
    to slow things down a bit.
    
    Here's a few of the rules from snort.conf:
    ---snip---
    var RESP_TCP resp:rst_all
    var RESP_UDP resp:icmp_all
    
    pass tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $INSIDE 80 ($RESP_TCP; msg:"WEB-IIS 
    cmd.exe access (FlexRsp)"; flags: A+; content:"cmd.exe"; nocase; 
    classtype:attempted-user; sid:1002; rev:1;)
    pass tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $INSIDE 80 ($RESP_TCP; msg:"WEB-IIS 
    CodeRed v2 root.exe access (FlexRsp)"; flags: A+; 
    uricontent:"scripts/root.exe?"; nocase; classtype: attempted-admin; 
    sid: 1256; rev: 1;)
    ---snip---
    
    Now you might be wondering why I'd use "pass" for these rules. As I 
    mentioned above, there simply isn't the resources to go through all of 
    the alerts at the end of the day. When "pass" is used, snort still 
    executes $RESP_TCP each time it sees a request for root.exe or 
    command.exe, it just doesn't generate an alert.
    
    Before using flexresp (connection _is_ established):
    
    [root@scanner root]# wget http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/cmd.exe
    --17:23:20--  http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/cmd.exe
               => `cmd.exe'
    Connecting to XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX:80... connected!
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found
    17:23:20 ERROR 404: Not Found.
    
    After enabling flexresp:
    
    --17:26:02--  http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/cmd.exe
      (try: 2) => `cmd.exe'
    Connecting to XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX:80... connected!
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
    Read error (Connection reset by peer) in headers.
    
    Essentially, snort is able to (silently) terminate all incoming 
    requests for cmd.exe and root.exe.
    
    Hope this helps,
    Nate
    
    -- 
    Nathan W. Labadie       | ab0781at_private	
    Sr. Security Specialist | 313/577.2126
    Wayne State University  | 313/577.5626 fax
    C&IT Security Office: http://security.wayne.edu
    
    
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