Re: Malicious use of grc.com

From: Blake McNeill (mcneillbat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 26 2001 - 23:46:09 PST

  • Next message: gabriel rosenkoetter: "Re: Malicious use of grc.com"

    Reading Steve Gibson (or someone claiming to be Steve Gibson at least)
    response to questions concerning this on
    http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,1859774~root=security,1~mode=flat, he
    says and I quote, "In other words, it is COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE to use the
    ShieldsUP system to launch any sort of denial of service attack against
    anyone. It's simply not true."
    
    Interesting...
    
    Blake
    
    
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <Magniat_private>
    To: <INCIDENTSat_private>
    Sent: Monday, November 26, 2001 12:53 PM
    Subject: Malicious use of grc.com
    
    
    > Greetings:
    >
    > ShieldsUp(tm) is an application developed by Steve Gibson of Gibson
    > Research Corporation that allows a web user to request a remote port scan
    > of their local system via the GRC.Com web site
    > (https://grc.com/x/ne.dll?bh0bkyd2).
    > The "Probe my Ports" option performs a scan of many common tcp ports
    > and reports the status of each port back to the user's browser.
    >
    > The development of the application and its method of identifying the
    > client IP address is quite insecure.  As a result, ShieldsUp! allows the
    web
    > user to
    > perform a port scan against any other machine on the Internet and return
    the
    > results to the web user.  The remote system will log the scan as having
    > originated from one of Steve Gibson's machines.
    >
    > Gibson has chosen to use a simple hidden tag in the client-side HTML code
    > to identify the IP address that is passed to the scanning engine.  Though
    > the client's IP address is hashed, it is trivial to alter the value of the
    > hidden tag in order to request that a different IP address be scanned.
    The
    > true IP address is never checked in the HTTP header during the scan -
    > ShieldsUp happily scans the other box while returning the result set into
    > the
    > browser of the box that requested the scan.
    >
    > Fenris, The Wolf, a member of Hammer of God, quickly reviewed
    > the hash algorithm used to represent the IP address and found it weak;
    > therefore, one can easily submit requests, via the Shields Up web page,
    > for specific IP addresses to be scanned.  These findings are not my own,
    > and I have not included the details of the hash here as it is used to
    > display a copyrighted page.  The Wolf may post his findings if he chooses
    > to do so, but I will not make that choice for him.
    >
    > Instead, we can easily bypass the need to crack the hash by simply using
    > the "IP Agent" supplied by Gibson.  Over a year ago, a hacked version of
    IP
    > Agent was published that allowed one to supply an address to scan-- Gibson
    > discounted this as a non-issue, but reportedly fixed IP Agent to perform a
    > check to prevent this from happening.
    >
    > However, IP Agent now supports multiple client IP addresses.  One simply
    > needs to bind the targeted IP addresses to a local interface and perform a
    > scan request.  In this case, ShieldsUp presents friendly command buttons
    > listing the IP addresses bound to the local interfaces and allows you to
    > select any one that you want scanned.  Again, no other checking is done,
    > and ShieldsUp will scan whatever IP address you ask it to and display the
    > results in your own browser.
    >
    > According to the scanning page, "Information gained will NOT be retained,
    > viewed, or used by us in any way for any purpose whatsoever" which
    > basically invites anyone to use Gibson's site to do port scans of other
    > people's boxes without fear of detection.
    >
    > Additionally, multiple post requests can be easily scripted to perform
    > scans against a site in attempts to perform a denial of service attack
    > against a host. In these cases, with sufficient requests generated, one
    > could ask grc.com to attack another site and it will comply.
    >
    > One would have hoped that instead of Mr. Gibson spending so much time
    > expounding on the theoretical DoS capabilities of Raw
    > Sockets, that he instead had used that time to properly develop his own
    > application in order to prevent the same.  Those concerned with malicious
    > attacks from grc.com should block Gibson's netblock at the border.
    >
    > Cheers,
    > Magni
    >
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