>Here's my concern. With worms like nimda, lion, and others, sniffing is a >major factor in analyzing the worm's propogation and exploitatoin >methods. An ssh based worm could take sniffing out of the picture (the >attack is over an encrypted service) and reduce forensic analysis to >artifact examination. Looks like we may need some honeypots... The encrypted activities of a hypothetical SSH worm could be logged using a honeypot and a network sniffing logger, one that just so happens to have the honeypot's private SSH key. SSHmitm of the dsniff toolkit might provide a good place to start with how to decrypt and log a sniffed SSH connection. An alternative approach would be a deliberately man in the middle proxy a SSH honeypot and make the proxy also "look" vulnerable to the worm. The proxy would do then be able to cleartext log all of the worm generated traffic, encrypted or not. Adam ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Feb 11 2002 - 12:17:48 PST