Re: "Nimda"?

From: Greg A. Woods (woodsat_private)
Date: Wed Feb 27 2002 - 14:25:42 PST

  • Next message: Matthew F. Caldwell: "RE: New Attack / New Vulnerability?"

    [ On Tuesday, February 26, 2002 at 18:30:32 (-0800), Jay D. Dyson wrote: ]
    > Subject: Re: "Nimda"?
    >
    > 	I've found that the best defense is a good offense, so I have an
    > automated notification facility in place that acts as a decoy.  When
    > either Code Red or Nimda hit my servers, the owner of the netblock is
    > immediately notified that their systems are being used as an attack
    > platform against other machines.
    
    Your "best offence" is in fact a dangerous mechanism that could be
    turned into a D.o.S. tool if it were poorly implemented and then widely
    deployed through social engineering attempts (such as your message
    above).
    
    Please DO NOT EVER implement or deploy automated notification systems
    without tightly integrating into them full summarisation features and
    mechanisms to avoid sending more than one notification to a given
    address at anything frequency more often than once per day, and
    preferably no more often than once per week (esp. after the initial day
    of a widespread infection).
    
    Most everyone with any length of experience at this learned a very long
    time ago, back in the days where helpful admins tried to notify their
    colleagues of lame DNS delegations for one example, that such
    distributed notification tools are far worse than the incidents they're
    trying to report.
    
    If you are not running a vulnerable server and yet you are reporting
    probes like this to anything but a central monitoring service that has
    explicitly requested your probes, then you are part of the problem, not
    part of the solution.
    
    As someone who receives e-mail addressed to such netblock contact
    addresses I've found it necessary to block e-mail from some automated
    notifiers lest my mailbox be flooded with such noise that prevents me
    from dealing with the real issues.  I.e. if you flood me I will ignore
    you.  Just be thankful I'm a good network neighbour I won't retaliate in
    kind!
    
    Don't cry "Wolf!" unless there's a _VERY_ real one breathing down your
    neck right now.  If you want real action to resolve actual damages or to
    stop an attack while it happens (that you cannot for whatever unlikely
    reason block somehow on your end) then with the privacy laws like they
    are today in most jurisdictions you'd best be prepared to go through the
    proper authorities.
    
    >  That tends to keep things like that down
    > to a dull roar (unless you're dealing with negligent admins who just don't
    > give a whoop).
    
    You're sadly mistaken if you believe there's any guaranteed
    correspondence between a netblock contact address and the owner of a
    machine which might happen to be infected with some silly worm or virus.
    If we had reason to search out all the infected machines in the
    netblocks we answer for then we would have no problem doing it without
    your help.  You are just getting in the way.
    
    Regardless, silly ongoing noise like Nimbda and CodeRed notifcations,
    especially after this much time since their initial release, is just
    that -- silly, useless, noise.  Even if you don't flood me with
    complaints about them then your one complaint will still go on the
    bottom of the pile and it will only be dealt with if it should ever
    manage to be the last thing in the pile, and thus become the top of the
    pile.  Don't hold your breath.  I do not have the time of day to worry
    about people who are either paranoid or revengeful about the likes of
    Nimbda and CodeRed.  If you don't run a vulnerable system then kindly
    ignore their probes, and if you do run a vulnerable system then either
    pull your network plug(s) or fix your silly system(s) and then ignore
    the probes!
    
    -- 
    								Greg A. Woods
    
    +1 416 218-0098;  <gwoodsat_private>;  <g.a.woodsat_private>;  <woodsat_private>
    Planix, Inc. <woodsat_private>; VE3TCP; Secrets of the Weird <woodsat_private>
    
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