Re: RemoteNC backdoors, attacks via ports 1433, 524, 139, 445, 21, destroyed files

From: switched (security-mail@q-east.net)
Date: Wed Mar 13 2002 - 11:59:29 PST

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    Recently I found 12 or so machines that had fluxray on them and I don't know
    how they got there...  But interestingly enough there was a file called
    "Project1" on each machine ( I don't remember the extension ).  All the
    machines were Windows 2000 SP1 but I am unsure of the Hotfixes, etc. that
    were applied to each.  I believe Fluxray was installed in
    C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\IPCSVC and was running as ipcsvc.exe.
    
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <bukysat_private>
    To: <incidentsat_private>
    Cc: <bukysat_private>
    Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2002 12:07 PM
    Subject: RemoteNC backdoors, attacks via ports 1433, 524, 139, 445, 21,
    destroyed files
    
    
    > We have experienced an unusually tenacious set of destructive attacks
    > on very many machines here, in three waves over the last several weeks.
    >
    > Last month it was port 1433 SQL server blank admin password attacks,
    > resulting in blasting of systems down to empty C: drives. Closely
    > following by another set of attacks (method unknown) from the same set
    > of hosts (in China), resulting in installation of the RemoteNC backdoor
    > (usually listening on TCP ports 4 or 6), and often ending in
    > destruction of the C: drive.
    >
    > This month, it looks like ping and port 524 probes, followed by a mix
    > of port 21, 139, and 445 activity.  Also including installation of
    > RemoteNC and/or wiping of C: drive, or at least removal of kernel
    > file.  Disabling of port 524 traffic still resulted in successful
    > attacks that apparently worked around lack of port 524 information
    > leaks.  We have known brute-force password attempts.  We DON'T KNOW
    > whether all entry is solely via weak passwords, or something else.
    >
    > I suspect they may be something called "Fluxay" which was published on
    > the same Chinese site (netxeyes) that publishes RemoteNC.  Last month
    > it was not downloadable to me.  Since then a few people have turned up
    > some copies for me.
    >
    > RemoteNC is easy to detect, as a TCP connection to it gets a "RemoteNC
    > password:" prompt.  Executable file on compromised machines is usually
    > "TCPMUX.EXE" or "TCPMX.EXE".  ISS shows the "tcpmux" or "tcpmx" service
    > running.  Recent antivirus software detects it (since we submitted it
    > to AV vendors last month).
    >
    >
    > *** If anybody is experiencing the same, CAN COMPARE NOTES? ***
    >
    >
    > Liudvikas Bukys
    > University of Rochester
    > bukysat_private
    >
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