Hi Tim, - First, reverse-patching a Nimda-infected host will certainly build up your futility muscles. Simply "fixing" the IIS and code-red vulns that *may* have allowed it in do nothing to alleviate the cancer that it spreads once it has a foothold on the system. - Second, if the poor sap was infected due to browsing / email / net share habits elsewhere, it'll be back on that host in short order anyway. ..better that you try to notify, then publicize the "offender". * Jim Harrison MCP(NT4, 2K), A+, Network+ Services Platform Group The burden of proof is not satisfied by a lack of evidence to the contrary. -----Original Message----- From: Deus, Attonbitus [mailto:Thorat_private] Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 07:35 To: INCIDENTSat_private Subject: Publishing Nimda Logs - Summary -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 First, I would like to thank everyone who took the time to reply, both publicly and privately. I appreciate the feedback. Vuln-Dev has been the most interactive with this thread, so if you have more to add, please post to vuln-dev or privately to save on moderation. Recap: I would say that > 90% of all the responses support publishing the list. Many of those stipulated that I should warn people first, and only post them after no action was taken. Additional ideas were to post a 'history' of contacts and actions taken. Some people are already posting such a list, and many of you offered to post your own logs if I make it available. Many were also exuberant about it with "Hell Yeah!" type posts- this speaks to the level of frustration out there. A very small majority of people, about 4%, said it was a Very Bad Idea as blackhats could use the list as a source for DDoS host candidates. I agree with Jay Dyson and others in that this information is already easily available to anyone with an Internet connection if that is what they are looking for. Just last November, Dug Song published papers showing that Nimda probes, globally, were at "roughly 5 *billion* attempts per day." Anyone with half a clue that was looking for bots could actively gather information in far greater quantities than what would be on my list. I can only imagine what the aggregate waste of bandwidth is at that level! I do not believe that withholding the list because it could be used maliciously is valid. The rest, about 6% or so, said to ignore it, spend the time securing your systems, or to just silently blackhole the offenders. Things learned: 1) ARIN is reportedly a bad source, or at least, outdated source, of contact info. 2) Jay also has a *nix product called EarlyBird, which will look up the contact info for you to email offenders. http://www.treachery.net/~jdyson/earlybird/ 3) www.dshield.org maintains information like this, and allows you to post logs to them. 4) Jonathan Bloomquist and others actively connect to offenders to send net messages to the console. Pretty cool. Next Step: I will probably proceed with my project, taking into account the suggestions of the posters. One thing now interests me more... In the vein of JBloomquist's post and another poster who said to reverse-patch the systems, I am willing to peek into Pandora's Box and explore that precise option- Waiting for an attack, and then reverse-patching the box. Please don't tell me about the legal ramifications- I don't care about that yet. What I would like to know is if anyone has such an animal, or how one would go about reverse-patching an attacking system-- I can't write that code, but would really like to try it out. Thanks to all for your help. AD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.1 iQA/AwUBPNk3oIhsmyD15h5gEQKAKACg5ooNMBmtill1Pt1K4PUUrewa/d0AnjFu Z1A93Vv4TneEr+QM6ewoRXs0 =hVJ+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
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