Re: Help with an odd log file...

From: Fabio Panigatti (ml-panigattiat_private)
Date: Thu Jun 05 2003 - 06:01:35 PDT

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    >     Total Length: 52
    >     Identification: 0xb82b
    >     Time to live: 118
    >     Sequence number: 1409168989
    >     Header length: 32 bytes
    >         .... ..1. = Syn: Set
    >     Window size: 55808
    >     Options: (12 bytes)
    >         Maximum segment size: 1460 bytes
    >         NOP
    >         Window scale: 2 (multiply by 4)
    >         NOP
    >         NOP
    >         SACK permitted
    
    
    From May 21 I received about 120 packets like this one:
    
     May 21 03:00:25 fw kernel: CATCHALL IN=eth2 OUT=eth0 SRC=126.123.252.5 
     DST=<myip> LEN=52 TOS=0x18 PREC=0x20 TTL=105 ID=58793 PROTO=TCP SPT=
     38039 DPT=41240 SEQ=2550999126 ACK=0 WINDOW=55808 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 
     OPT (020405B40103030201010402)
    
    Every packet is identical to each other, except for TTL field, which vary 
    from 102 and 108, and IP-ID, always set to 58793 except a couple of times. 
    This kind of SYN packet doesn't belong to any known TCP/IP stack. There are 
    a lot of field in common with the packet you have captured, first of all the 
    tcp windows size, but also the tcp options worth a look. Both are peculiar. 
    I think that are crafted by the same tool. 
    
    <myip> is a w2k workstation within an ip range protected by a netfilter 
    firewall. NEW sesisons aren't permitted from the internet to the internal 
    net.
    
    Until yesterday I received packets only from 126.123.252.5, with a period
    varying from 5 minutes to 10 hours, but the average rate is growing. All 
    the packets are directed to <myip> and none to other ip's in the same ip
    range, so the traffic is specifically aimed to <myip>. 
    
    On Jun 2 I found those two lines:
    
     Jun  2 08:25:59 fw kernel: CATCHALL IN=eth2 OUT=eth0 SRC=68.76.86.82 
     DST=<mioip> LEN=52 TOS=0x18 PREC=0x20 TTL=109 ID=58793 PROTO=TCP SPT=
     38039 DPT=41240 SEQ=2550999126 ACK=0 WINDOW=55808 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 
     OPT (020405AC0103030201010402)
    
     Jun  2 15:34:58 fw kernel: CATCHALL IN=eth2 OUT=eth0 SRC=207.75.1.254 
     DST=<mioip> LEN=52 TOS=0x18 PREC=0x20 TTL=104 ID=58793 PROTO=TCP SPT=
     23657 DPT=41240 SEQ=4057633743 ACK=0 WINDOW=55808 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 
     OPT (020405640103030201010402)
    
    So this is not an unusual misconfigured network appliance trying to talk
    with the wrong ip address, which was my first thought.
    
    68.76.86.82 is a known blacklisted open proxy, running an obfuscated 
    tcp/ip stack, but the packet above doesn't come from the proxy daemon
    but it's originated by some tool runned on the host. Also 207.75.1.254 
    has an obfuscated tcp/ip stack (both have a mangled TTL).
    126.123.252.5 is, obviously, a iana-reserved non-routable ip address. Why
    this kind of address? Maybe because it's the private address of a r00ted 
    server behind a stateful DNAT firewall or load balancer with no SNAT rules 
    for the NEW traffic originated from the server. So, the attacker gained a 
    shell from the outside (the DNAT permit this) but when he try to connect 
    from there to the outside the traffic is sourced from the wrong ip address 
    because of the lack of SNAT in this direction.
    
    Actually I'm working on three directions:
    1) a trojan/backdor installed on <myip> which sent his haddress (<myip>) 
       to someone (and now someone is trying to connect); 
    2) a miscoded trojan/backdor (with <myip> ip address hardcoded for a typing
       error) that is trying to call home to notify his address. The coder 
       erroneusly typed <myip> instead of the real home ip, and so the infected 
       hosts are trying to contact me instead of the real malware owner;
    3) a joke by some good guys.
    
    <myip> is a w2k workstation within an ip range protected by a netfilter 
    firewall. NEW sessions aren't permitted from the internet to the internal 
    net. The host is also protected by a personal firewall with application
    based egress filtering, two antivirus (one real-time) updated every 6 
    hours. The workstation is very hardened, with tight acls on code execution 
    permissions (users and folders) and folder/file access, usually operated 
    by skilled and security conscious users. For all this I think that point 
    one isn't a good choice. Since I log session state for all tcp traffic
    flowing through the firewall, I parsed the past month logs searching for
    unusual tcp sessions originated from <myip>, but nothing strange happened.
    I can't say nothing about udp and icmp.
    
    Point 2 and 3 was two good choices until I saw your post.
    
    No other bright idea's, now. Since it seems that also routeable address 
    (unlike the first one) are involved, I arranged a simple honeypot, but 
    until now only 126.123.252.5 still try to connect.
    
    
    Fabio
    
    PS: sorry for my poor english.
    
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