Re: Software vendor clueless

From: Valdis.Kletnieksat_private
Date: Tue Aug 19 2003 - 21:47:33 PDT

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    On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 18:32:11 EDT, Mark Medici <markat_private>  said:
    
    > If, in fact, the firewall is configured as indicated, and that only
    > authorized IP addresses from the software vendor's IP space is permitted
    > to access pcAnywhere, then it is NOT a trivial hack to gain access to
    > pcAnywhere in order to exploit the weak passwords.  In order to
    > circumvent the firewall, the intruder would have to first compromise a
    > router or host at either the vendor or customer's end, or somewhere in
    > between, or the firewall itself.  Or the intruder would need to gain
    > physical access to one of these end locations.
    
    Actually, no.
    
    RFC1948: Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks. S. Bellovin. May 1996.
         (Format: TXT=13074 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
    
    Turns out it was this very attack that Kevin Mitnick used on Shimomura's
    machines...
    
    And it turns out that a lot of vendors still get it wrong, or suboptimal:
    
    http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/tcpseq.html
    
    
    



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