Neil Bortnak wrote: > > Scott Leerssen wrote: > > > > Jesse Pollard wrote: > > > > > > A file may have its permissions changed to deny the process access. In the > > > current method, access is only checked on open. So once a process does a > > > fork+exec (optionally with setuid..) access to the given file should no > > > longer be allowed. > > > > I disagree with this scenario. In trusted programming, there are often > > times when you want to gain access to a file/socket via a privileged > > process and then pass along the descriptor to an less privileged > > process. Monitoring read/write is more secure, but far from practical > > in most cases. > > I don't think it would hurt to put in security hooks to the read/write > functions. If no security module makes use of them, then there really > isn't any performance hit. If a paranoid module wants to slow I/O down > by 10%, that's it's perogative. > > Neil I agree. I need to make better use of the "reply-all" button and not worry about policy. After all, flexible policy is what this is all about. _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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