Re: backward compat / access (was Re: Benchmarks)

From: aleph1at_private
Date: Tue Apr 17 2001 - 15:04:20 PDT

  • Next message: Flavien Lebarbe: "Re: backward compat / access (was Re: Benchmarks)"

    * Flavien Lebarbe (flavienat_private) [010417 21:58]:
    > The idea of "a NULL pointer in the struct keeps the default -ie no 
    > check- function in place" is reasonable I think (may be a flag 
    > 'default when nothing specified is refuse' could be useful, I 
    > dunno).
    
    You are proposing that the default behavior be to fail open. This type
    of behavior is not normally considered secure. If a new system call
    is added to the kernel it may provide a way to bypass the policy
    enforced the security module.
    
    It would be considered a more secure behavior to refuse to load the
    module if there is a mismatch between the kernel version and the
    versions supported by the security module, or possibly simply disabling
    the system call.
    
    At the very least this behavior (whether the system should fail open
    or closed) should be determined by the module or user configuration.
    
    -- 
    Elias Levy
    SecurityFocus.com
    http://www.securityfocus.com/
    Si vis pacem, para bellum
    
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