Re: 2001_05_09 patch against 2.4.4

From: Chris Evans (chrisat_private)
Date: Tue May 15 2001 - 15:58:31 PDT

  • Next message: Chris Evans: "Re: 2001_05_09 patch against 2.4.4"

    On Tue, 15 May 2001 jmjonesat_private wrote:
    > > Can you still think of a case where read/write hooking is necessary?
    > Suppose there's a crack that replaces the task's code at some point after
    > the file is opened?  Subsequently, a sensitive file (e.g. /etc/passwd) may
    > be compromised during a read or write from what apparently is a valid
    A very good point. To see the way I'd like to see this solved, consider
    "netscape" - surely a likely candidate for "a crack that replaces the
    task's code at some point" :-)
    The netscape process should be started with security restrictions in place
    - i.e. it should not get the chance to open anything remotely "sensitive"
    (read /etc/passwd, write the user's .rhosts etc). It should only get
    access to its cache files, config files etc.[1]
    linux-security-module mailing list

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue May 15 2001 - 15:59:36 PDT