Re: sys_setpriority error

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Thu May 31 2001 - 11:20:37 PDT

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    * Titus D. Winters (titusat_private) wrote:
    > How about this:
    > no_nice = security_ops->task_ops->setnice(p, niceval);
    > if (p->uid != current->euid &&
    >         p->uid != current->uid && no_nice) {
    > can become
    > no_nice = security_ops->task_ops->setnice(p, niceval);
    > if (no_nice) {
    > And put all of the access control logic into the dummy functions.  Thus
    > the LSM can then either be more or less restrictive, but the default will
    > be just the same as the base kernel version.
    > Extending this means that we move all of the places that the old capable()
    > checks were into the dummies, and all the other hooks can still just
    > return 0, or do a euid/uid check.  Then those of us that want the LSM to
    > be more restrictive than the default can do that, those that want the
    > capabilities style of being more permissive than the default can do that,
    > and overall we have more functionality.
    This is sounding good to me.  It complicates the module writer's job, or
    perhaps just makes stacking with capabilities more critical.  But I'd rather
    push this complication to the module writer than adding a bunch of hooks to
    explicitly support override deny vs. override allow (afterall, that's a
    policy choice for the module and could hopefully be captured in one hook).
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