Re: permissive vs. restrictive issue and solutions...

From: Stephen Smalley (sdsat_private)
Date: Mon Jun 04 2001 - 07:31:58 PDT

  • Next message: jmjonesat_private: "Re: Assurance, permissiveness, and restriction"

    On Fri, 1 Jun 2001, Howard Holm wrote:
    
    > In summary, if you haven't already guessed, I'm finding the arguments
    > for migrating all security logic into modules more compelling than
    > those against.
    
    Although I agree with the idea of migrating all of the security logic
    into the modules in principle, I think it may be a mistake for us
    to do so right now for the following reasons:
    
    1) It is likely to be politically difficult to gain acceptance
    from the Linux kernel developers for such pervasive and significant
    changes to the Linux kernel.  It seems wiser to go for an incremental
    approach - first gain acceptance for a set of new hook calls in the
    kernel, leaving the existing base logic alone, and demonstrate the
    value of the new hooks through example modules, and then subsequently
    lobby for migrating the base logic into the hook functions.
    
    2) The work factor for changing _all_ of the existing locations
    where the base logic exists is quite substantial, does not directly
    contribute to supporting _any_ of our security modules, and
    could prevent us from making timely progress in this effort.
    
    3) The potential for introducing subtle bugs by trying to migrate
    all of the existing logic behind the hook interfaces seems high.
    This is especially true since the right location for inserting
    our hook calls often does not correspond with the locations of
    existing logic, and our hook calls often need more information
    than existing logic (e.g. the capable logic is merely based on
    process state, and the capable calls often occur immediately on
    entry to a system call, before kernel copies are made of
    parameters that are needed by the hook).  An example of this
    can be seen in the existing changes to the delete_module call,
    where the hook call doesn't cover all of the same cases as
    the original capable() check.
    
    --
    Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
    ssmalleyat_private
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
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