Re: State of Audit Proposal ?

From: richard offer (offerat_private)
Date: Wed Jul 25 2001 - 07:55:52 PDT

  • Next message: KRAMER,STEVEN (HP-USA,ex1): "RE: State of Audit Proposal ?"

    * frm crispinat_private "07/24/01 23:37:30 -0700" | sed '1,$s/^/* /'
    *
    * Casey Schaufler wrote:
    * 
    *> Crispin Cowan wrote:
    *> 
    *> > Are you really losing valuable audit information if an access is
    *> > deined because of DAC, whne it also would have been denied because of
    *> > MAC?
    *> 
    *> Some of the people who want to buy our Big boxes for
    *> purposes better unknown think so. They care ALOT more
    *> about MAC than DAC.
    * 
    * One does not follow from the other.  I care a lot more about MAC, too,
    * but that doesn't mean that I care a lot about access requests that get
    * denied by DAC that would have also been denied by MAC.
    * 
    * I'm trying and failing to contrive a scenario in which it is a Big Deal
    * that an attacker:
    * 
    *    * has a shell on a critical system
    *    * is probing the security configuration looking for weakness
    *    * would be blocked by both DAC and MAC
    *    * auditing/host IDS is configured to raise alarms if MAC violations
    *      are attempted    
    *    * auditing/host IDS is NOT configured to raise alarms if
    *      DAC violations are attempted
    * 
    * Individually many of these items are plausible, but the combination is
    * weird. If the system is so critical, then why is IDS configured to only
    * bitch about MAC violations? If it is because alarming at DAC violations
    * is too noisy, then why do so many people do so much work on a system that
    * is so critical?  It just doesn't make sense.
    
    Because the only way they could buy the machine was for distinct groups to
    join together and get it. Say its split between classified and unclassified
    sites, or its acting as a chinese wall in a financial institution.
    
    Replace "critical" with "huge big server", optionally remove the second
    item, and you've got our customers.
    
    You really don't want to be sending the Marines in just because a random
    user tried to cat > /etc/fstab when they really meant cat /etc/fstab.
    
    * 
    * Crispin
    
    richard.
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Richard Offer                     Technical Lead, Trust Technology, SGI
    "Specialization is for insects"
    _______________________________________________________________________
    
    
    _______________________________________________
    linux-security-module mailing list
    linux-security-moduleat_private
    http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Jul 25 2001 - 07:58:28 PDT