Re: State of Audit Proposal ?

From: Mikel Matthews (mikel@argus-systems.com)
Date: Wed Jul 25 2001 - 13:42:49 PDT

  • Next message: David Wagner: "Re: MAC before DAC vs DAC before MAC"

    Casey is right here.  On a number of MLS systems lots of audit messages
    will be generated via DAC failures when no one is really trying to
    probe/break the system.  Various commands may attempt to access an
    object and if it is successful then do something that is entirely within
    the authorization of the command.  If it fails the access it does
    something else.  If DAC failure is being audited an audit entry is made
    that someone will have to evaluate so some sites may not audit DAC until
    they are sure something is going on.  On the other hand when someone
    attempts to access an object to which they do not have the proper MAC
    access, that is cause for concern and so they want to audit those
    actions.
    
    Mike
    
    Casey Schaufler wrote:
    > 
    > Crispin Cowan wrote:
    > 
    > > I'm trying and failing to contrive a scenario in which it is a Big Deal that an
    > > attacker:
    > >
    > >    * has a shell on a critical system
    > >    * is probing the security configuration looking for weakness
    > >    * would be blocked by both DAC and MAC
    > >    * auditing/host IDS is configured to raise alarms if MAC violations are attempted
    > >    * auditing/host IDS is NOT configured to raise alarms if DAC violations are
    > >      attempted
    > 
    > Your scenario has a couple assumptions which constrain it unduly.
    > You're assuming malace with "is probing ...", which is not
    > required for the situation to be interesting. You're assuming
    > that DAC is considered important at all when in many installations
    > it's not, to the point that auditing is really disabled for DAC
    > checks. The only situation they care about is a MAC violation,
    > and they're not watching DAC so as to reduce the audit output to
    > managable levels.
    > 
    > --
    > 
    > Casey Schaufler                         Manager, Trust Technology, SGI
    > caseyat_private                           voice: 650.933.1634
    > casey_pat_private                   Pager: 888.220.0607
    > 
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    -- 
    
    Mikel L. Matthews
    V.P. and Chief Engineer
    Argus Systems Group, Inc.		www.argus-systems.com
    (217) 355-6308
    
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