Re: MAC before DAC vs DAC before MAC

From: David Wagner (dawat_private)
Date: Sun Jul 29 2001 - 15:07:10 PDT

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    Casey Schaufler  wrote:
    >You are argueing that I ought to compromise my security
    >policy (MAC before DAC) because [...]
    
    Well, now I'm surely confused.  That's not what I was suggesting.  I was
    criticizing some performance arguments that didn't look to me like an
    adequate basis for altering the LSM architecture.  And I'm surprised to
    hear you think that I was suggesting you compromise your security policy.
    That wasn't my intent.
    
    Maybe I should explain why I was raising questions on this subject.
    My point wasn't to suggest that some policy goals are more important than
    others.  Rather, I heard someone suggest doing in-module checks before
    in-kernel checks, and when asked for justification, I heard two answers:
     - audit
     - performance [*]
    Others have questioned the audit part, but I was questioning the
    performance justifications.
    
    I'm not suggesting that you abandon your policy goals.  But I still don't
    see what policy goals would force us to prefer one ordering over another.
    I suspect we can all agree that the ordering of checks is not a policy
    goal in and of itself, although it may be a way to achieve some such goal.
    What policy goals are incompatible with the current ordering?
    
    (Well, let me qualify my above remarks with two caveats.  If the goal is
    to avoid covert timing channels, then the ordering matters, but I'm not
    sure that the LSM project is prepared to take on this goal, and I think
    it would take a lot more than just changes to LSM to immunize Linux
    against covert timing channels.  Likewise, if the goal is audit, then
    ordering may matter, but others have said that we should wait on audit.
    What does that leave?)
    
    
    Footnote [*]:
      The only argument I heard for performance went along these lines:
      the performance issue only comes up for denied syscalls, but we need
      to optimize even denied accesses, because there are some cases where
      the kernel's checks might take a lot longer than the module's checks,
      and it is important to shortcut those checks and return an error to
      the user as quickly as possible.  That's the performance justification
      I heard, anyway.
    
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