richard offer wrote: >* frm crispinat_private "09/05/01 16:10:35 -0700" | sed '1,$s/^/* /' >* So, in no event are we going to get "no short circuiting". With that in >* mind, does the "kinda authoritative" approach embodied in Stephen's patch >* -> Lachlan's patch -> Chris Wright's patch present a substantial >* improvement in LSM usefulness to SGI? > >Yes. The principle is "always call a hook". The implementation of that >principle can be either > But that principle has never been generally accepted. In fact, I have heard from many people that the Linux code base is fairly actively hostile to such an approach: trying to put hooks in all places where a short-circuit might occur creates a massive proliferation of hooks. For very similar reasons, doing pre-DAC logic hooks also creates a massive prolifieration of hooks: the hooks must be replicated down through all the DAC logic at every short circuit branch. The proposed Smalley/Lachlin/Wright patch does not provide for either. It does provide an authortative-ish hook style, which can be short-circuited. Is that useful to SGI? If so, then IMHO Chris Wright's analysis suggests that it is easily cheap enough to justify. If not, then we should revert to the simpler restrictive-only hooks. IMHO, "no short circuits" was not on the table. It was discussed (at length :-) at the DC BOF, with no satisfying resolution. The conclusion that I understood was that SGI would look at Smalley's patch to determine if it was acceptable, and if not, propose enhancements. The code enhancements proposed seem to be fine (a little house keeping to bring it up to date) but the text enhancements ("... and close all the short circuits") are not, and the two responses don't seem to be consistent with each other. Uh, help? Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com Security Hardened Linux Distribution: http://immunix.org Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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