Re: Authoritative Hooks

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 12 2001 - 12:19:53 PST

  • Next message: Stephen Smalley: "Re: Authoritative Hooks"

    * Casey Schaufler (caseyat_private) wrote:
    > One more thing ...
    > I wrote:
    > >	if (!(uid-checks-out-okay) && !capable(CAP_XYZ))
    > should be changed to:
    > 	if (!capable(CAP_XYZ) && !(uid-checks-out-okay))
    > if C+R is going to be the Official way to use LSM.
    > Otherwise, the architecture is going to advocate
    > (require?) that code with potential side-effects
    > get executed in cases where it is at best unnecessary
    > and in some cases (side effects) may cause the system
    > to break.
    while i absolutely agree that side-effects can cause big headaches,
    i'm not sure that the in-kernel checks that utliize capable() will
    actually cause such a problem.  in general, they tend to be simple
    uid tests, mode bit tests, etc.  hmmm, time for another round of
    grepping i guess ;-)
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