Re: Authoritative Hooks

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chrisat_private

* Casey Schaufler (caseyat_private) wrote:
> 
> One more thing ...
> 
> I wrote:
> 
> >	if (!(uid-checks-out-okay) && !capable(CAP_XYZ))
> 
> should be changed to:
> 
> 	if (!capable(CAP_XYZ) && !(uid-checks-out-okay))
> 
> if C+R is going to be the Official way to use LSM.
> Otherwise, the architecture is going to advocate
> (require?) that code with potential side-effects
> get executed in cases where it is at best unnecessary
> and in some cases (side effects) may cause the system
> to break.

while i absolutely agree that side-effects can cause big headaches,
i'm not sure that the in-kernel checks that utliize capable() will
actually cause such a problem.  in general, they tend to be simple
uid tests, mode bit tests, etc.  hmmm, time for another round of
grepping i guess ;-)

-chris

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