Re: Legitimate Question

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chrisat_private

* jmjonesat_private (jmjonesat_private) wrote:
> 
> Wouldn't it be useful for a userspace application that is
> setuid root to be able to bypass the module's checks.  
> Isn't setuid ROOT generally assumed to be a "non-restricted"
> condition?

Well, this is a policy choice.  In the case of the capability module,
for example, setuid root does basically give you an unconstrained process.

> How does the new paradigm change that, specifically, and 
> why SHOULD it do that?

The new paradigm allows you to know when a setuid program is being
executed and make any policy choice you want about the credentials of
the program.  if (full_moon && setuid) grant_full_priveleges; or
whatever the policy may be ;-)

thanks,
-chris
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