Russell Coker wrote: > Isn't the name of a directory entry more important than the type of object it > is? ... I'll tell you where he came from, here's the story, and it's true ... The question arises in that peculiar case of the path "less/more", where "less" is less secret than "more", which is more secret. How did it come about that you have a more secret director contained in a less secret one? After all, when the directory was created it was created in a directory that was writable by the creating process, which implies it was running less secret.* An explicit action taken by a less secret process would set the label to more secret. All these actions would take place while running less secret, using only less secret information**. Thus, there can't be an issue because the name of the more secret directory was created in a less secret context. Simple, ain't it? ---- * On Trusted Solaris a user running less secret would use # mksecdir more more while on Trusted Irix it would be # mkdir more ; chlabel more more ** less secret processes having no access to more secret information, of course. -- Casey Schaufler Manager, Trust Technology, SGI caseyat_private voice: 650.933.1634 casey_pat_private Pager: 877.557.3184 _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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