include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++++++
include/net/sock.h | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.c | 29 +++++---------
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 9 +---
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 15 +++----
net/sctp/input.c | 4 +
security/dummy.c | 5 ++
7 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/include/linux/security.h linux-2.5.59.w1/include/linux/security.h
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/include/linux/security.h Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/include/linux/security.h Fri Feb 7 01:16:22 2003
@@ -684,6 +684,12 @@
* @sock contains the socket structure.
* @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
+ * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
+ * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
+ * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
+ * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
+ * @skb contains the incoming network data.
*
* Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
*
@@ -1073,6 +1079,7 @@
int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket * sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket * sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket * sock, int how);
+ int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock * sk, struct sk_buff * skb);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
};
@@ -2312,6 +2319,12 @@
{
return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
}
+
+static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock * sk,
+ struct sk_buff * skb)
+{
+ return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb (sk, skb);
+}
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static inline int security_socket_create (int family, int type, int protocol)
{
@@ -2394,6 +2407,11 @@
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock * sk,
+ struct sk_buff * skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/include/net/sock.h linux-2.5.59.w1/include/net/sock.h
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/include/net/sock.h Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/include/net/sock.h Fri Feb 7 01:18:37 2003
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h> /* struct sk_buff */
+#include <linux/security.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
#include <linux/filter.h>
@@ -458,28 +459,45 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
/**
- * sk_filter - run a packet through a socket filter
+ * __sk_filter - run a packet through a socket filter
+ * @sk: sock associated with &sk_buff
* @skb: buffer to filter
- * @filter: filter to apply
+ * @needlock: set to 1 if the sock is not locked by caller.
*
* Run the filter code and then cut skb->data to correct size returned by
* sk_run_filter. If pkt_len is 0 we toss packet. If skb->len is smaller
* than pkt_len we keep whole skb->data. This is the socket level
* wrapper to sk_run_filter. It returns 0 if the packet should
- * be accepted or 1 if the packet should be tossed.
+ * be accepted or -EPERM if the packet should be tossed.
+ *
+ * This function should not be called directly, use sk_filter instead
+ * to ensure that the LSM security check is also performed.
*/
-
-static inline int sk_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_filter *filter)
+
+static inline int __sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int needlock)
{
- int pkt_len;
+ int err = 0;
- pkt_len = sk_run_filter(skb, filter->insns, filter->len);
- if(!pkt_len)
- return 1; /* Toss Packet */
- else
- skb_trim(skb, pkt_len);
+ if (sk->filter) {
+ struct sk_filter *filter;
+
+ if (needlock)
+ bh_lock_sock(sk);
+
+ filter = sk->filter;
+ if (filter) {
+ int pkt_len = sk_run_filter(skb, filter->insns,
+ filter->len);
+ if (!pkt_len)
+ err = -EPERM;
+ else
+ skb_trim(skb, pkt_len);
+ }
- return 0;
+ if (needlock)
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+ }
+ return err;
}
/**
@@ -506,8 +524,26 @@
atomic_add(sk_filter_len(fp), &sk->omem_alloc);
}
+#else
+
+static inline int __sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int needlock)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_FILTER */
+static inline int sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int needlock)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = security_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return __sk_filter(sk, skb, needlock);
+}
+
/*
* Socket reference counting postulates.
*
@@ -712,36 +748,31 @@
static inline int sock_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ int err = 0;
+
/* Cast skb->rcvbuf to unsigned... It's pointless, but reduces
number of warnings when compiling with -W --ANK
*/
- if (atomic_read(&sk->rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >= (unsigned)sk->rcvbuf)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- if (sk->filter) {
- int err = 0;
- struct sk_filter *filter;
-
- /* It would be deadlock, if sock_queue_rcv_skb is used
- with socket lock! We assume that users of this
- function are lock free.
- */
- bh_lock_sock(sk);
- if ((filter = sk->filter) != NULL && sk_filter(skb, filter))
- err = -EPERM;
- bh_unlock_sock(sk);
- if (err)
- return err; /* Toss packet */
+ if (atomic_read(&sk->rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >= (unsigned)sk->rcvbuf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_FILTER */
+
+ /* It would be deadlock, if sock_queue_rcv_skb is used
+ with socket lock! We assume that users of this
+ function are lock free.
+ */
+ err = sk_filter(sk, skb, 1);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
skb->dev = NULL;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
skb_queue_tail(&sk->receive_queue, skb);
if (!sk->dead)
sk->data_ready(sk,skb->len);
- return 0;
+out:
+ return err;
}
static inline int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.c linux-2.5.59.w1/net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.c
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.c Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.c Fri Feb 7 01:16:22 2003
@@ -566,26 +566,19 @@
*/
static __inline__ int dn_queue_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int sig, struct sk_buff_head *queue)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- struct sk_filter *filter;
-#endif
-
+ int err;
+
/* Cast skb->rcvbuf to unsigned... It's pointless, but reduces
number of warnings when compiling with -W --ANK
*/
- if (atomic_read(&sk->rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >= (unsigned)sk->rcvbuf
-)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- if (sk->filter) {
- int err = 0;
- if ((filter = sk->filter) != NULL && sk_filter(skb, sk->filter))
- err = -EPERM; /* Toss packet */
- if (err)
- return err;
+ if (atomic_read(&sk->rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >= (unsigned)sk->rcvbuf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_FILTER */
+
+ err = sk_filter(sk, skb, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
@@ -603,8 +596,8 @@
(sig == SIGURG) ? POLL_PRI : POLL_IN);
}
read_unlock(&sk->callback_lock);
-
- return 0;
+out:
+ return err;
}
static void dn_nsp_otherdata(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.5.59.w1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c Fri Feb 7 01:16:22 2003
@@ -1696,12 +1696,6 @@
*/
int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- struct sk_filter *filter = sk->filter;
- if (filter && sk_filter(skb, filter))
- goto discard;
-#endif /* CONFIG_FILTER */
-
if (sk->state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) { /* Fast path */
TCP_CHECK_TIMER(sk);
if (tcp_rcv_established(sk, skb, skb->h.th, skb->len))
@@ -1804,6 +1798,9 @@
if (!xfrm_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
+ if (sk_filter(sk, skb, 0))
+ goto discard_and_relse;
+
skb->dev = NULL;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c linux-2.5.59.w1/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c Fri Feb 7 01:16:22 2003
@@ -1470,9 +1470,6 @@
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_opt *tp;
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- struct sk_filter *filter;
-#endif
struct sk_buff *opt_skb = NULL;
/* Imagine: socket is IPv6. IPv4 packet arrives,
@@ -1486,11 +1483,8 @@
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
return tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
-#ifdef CONFIG_FILTER
- filter = sk->filter;
- if (filter && sk_filter(skb, filter))
+ if (sk_filter(sk, skb, 0))
goto discard;
-#endif /* CONFIG_FILTER */
/*
* socket locking is here for SMP purposes as backlog rcv
@@ -1641,6 +1635,9 @@
if(sk->state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
goto do_time_wait;
+ if (sk_filter(sk, skb, 0))
+ goto discard_and_relse;
+
skb->dev = NULL;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
@@ -1672,6 +1669,10 @@
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
+discard_and_relse:
+ sock_put(sk);
+ goto discard_it;
+
do_time_wait:
if (skb->len < (th->doff<<2) || tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(TcpInErrs);
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/net/sctp/input.c linux-2.5.59.w1/net/sctp/input.c
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/net/sctp/input.c Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/net/sctp/input.c Fri Feb 7 01:27:49 2003
@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@
if (!xfrm_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_release;
+ ret = sk_filter(sk, skb, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto discard_release;
+
/* Create an SCTP packet structure. */
chunk = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk);
if (!chunk) {
diff -urN -X dontdiff linux-2.5.59.w0/security/dummy.c linux-2.5.59.w1/security/dummy.c
--- linux-2.5.59.w0/security/dummy.c Fri Feb 7 01:29:51 2003
+++ linux-2.5.59.w1/security/dummy.c Fri Feb 7 01:16:22 2003
@@ -674,6 +674,10 @@
return 0;
}
+static int dummy_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
@@ -819,6 +823,7 @@
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
}
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This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Feb 06 2003 - 07:20:21 PST