* ¶«·½ ó»ÎÄ (phanixat_private) wrote: > > The LSM documentation mentioned that in order to support POSIX.1e > capabilities LSM provides a minimal support to permissive hook functions. > > 1. What does "minimal" mean here? Why minimal? Minimal because there was an existing capabilties infrastructure that required permissive hooks, so we just used that. What we ideally wanted was fully authoritative hooks, but this is invasive as Sergey said. > 2. In the LSM kernel patch for 2.4.19, which hooks are permissive? As Sergey pointed out, the capable() hook is the only permissive hook. This is context specific. Not all capabilities are used to override kernel permission checks however, they are the entire access control check (see use of CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the fs/namespace.c). A fine example of the permissive hook is CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE in the vfs_permission() function. This capability allows the user to override the normal DAC check on file access. thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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