Re: [PATCH][RFC] Remove kmod_set_label hook

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Wed Mar 26 2003 - 15:33:04 PST

  • Next message: Russell Coker: "Re: [PATCH][RFC] Remove kmod_set_label hook"

    * Russell Coker (russellat_private) wrote:
    > On Wed, 26 Mar 2003 18:56, Stephen D. Smalley wrote:
    > > > I obviously need more caffeine.. I was pretty sure stuff running out
    > > > of keventd was in the kernel context, and as a result was essentially
    > > > trusted code.  How would this work?
    > >
    > > Different jobs run from the keventd work queue (and different kernel
    > > threads using reparent_to_init) are likely to require different
    > > permissions, and it would be preferable to maintain them in separate
    > > security "domains" rather than lumping them all into one all powerful
    > > domain for least privilege purposes.  Even "trusted" code should be
    > Even just having them in the kernel context would be an improvement over the 
    > current situation.
    I'm not following you.  The (now old) kmod_set_label, and reparent_to_init
    both allowed you to set effectively a kernel context.
    > We have just had to change polity to allow the init program greater access 
    > than it would otherwise require because a kernel thread needed more access, 
    > which is not desirable.
    Why?  The init in reparent_to_init is the initial kernel thread.  The
    init program is exec'd late in bootup.  The exec can easily be a domain
    transition for init.  What am I missing?
    Linux Security Modules
    linux-security-module mailing list

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Mar 26 2003 - 15:35:30 PST