I would agree with Stephen with adding this restriction as well. If the audit logs aren't trustworthy, the usefulness of them is minimized -Chad -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:sds@private] Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 10:05 AM To: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: lsm; Crispin Cowan Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM hooks for audit On Wed, 2004-09-15 at 10:32, Serge Hallyn wrote: > The last one is the most dubious one in my mind, but we do want to > prevent a user from sending fake login audit messages, either to mislead > the auditor or to fill the log with garbage. I agree that it should be controlled, and so should AUDIT_USER; you don't want arbitrary processes being able to flood the logs. -- Stephen Smalley <sds@private> National Security Agency
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