Hi! > > > +Limitations: IMA does not detect corruption of software once it is > > > +loaded into main memory. Instead, it indicates known vulnerabilities > > > +in such software (e.g., buffer overflow) by securely identifying the > > > +software at load-time. Only executable files (binaries, libraries, > > > +kernel modules) are measured by default. However, IMA offers a > > > +sysfs-interface that allows applications to instruct the kernel to > > > +measure files that they have opened. > > > > What is it good for, then? So I have to put my backdoor into script, > > not into an executable... > > Scripts can be measured as well (from the user space). > > For example, equipping the bash shell with 5-10 lines of code, bash > initiates IMA measurements on scripts and files that are sourced into bash before > they are "executed" by bash. This way, startup scripts and executed scripts can > be logged as measurements and the measuremnt list will include > them. Well, for this to be usefull, you'd have to split files into two categories: 1) files that do not change 2) files that can not compromise your security. I guess that /etc/shadow *has to change*, and it still can compromise your system security. Same with basch scripts; you can make bash checksum its script, but when user modifies his first script, you'll detect system as "compromised". I guess it can work... but I don't see how it can work in Linux. Pavel
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